

Addendum to My Request for Precautionary Measures Against Every Nation in the World

Lying, Deceiving, Corruption, Obfuscating, Ignoring and Violating Civil, Constitutional, and Human Rights, Freedoms, Liberties, and Duties are Crimes Against Humanity

For the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Petition No. P-330-20

Lying, Deceiving, Corruption, Ignoring, and violating rights have been a human behavioral trait throughout mankind's existence. The only way to reduce these compulsions is through my proposed human rights treaty titled **UNIVERSAL AFFIRMATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FREEDOMS, LIBERTIES, AND DUTIES** emphasizing **ETHIC (18) PRESERVING THE GENERAL WELFARE** (Original) (Pages 17–18):

It is the duty of Government to provide the educational curriculum for **CRITICAL THINKING, OCCAM'S RAZOR, THE ETHIC OF RECIPROCITY (THE GOLDEN RULE)** and **THE BUTTERFLY EFFECT** from **CHAOS THEORY** as applied to Behavioral Psychology to public school systems at the elementary, junior high and high school levels.

The intent here is to provide young students with the cognitive skills they need to develop their own moral code of conduct, to instinctively determine right from wrong, and to think for themselves without the coercive effect from **GROUP THINK** associated with bullies, criminal gangs and party politics.

In support of my **REQUEST FOR PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES** for the entire world I present **FEDERALIST PAPER NO. 10 THE UNION AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST DOMESTIC FACTION AND INSURRECTION** discussing the United States Constitutional

FEDERALIST No. 10

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED (THE UNION AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST DOMESTIC FACTION AND INSURRECTION)

From the New York Packet.

Friday, November 23, 1787.

MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately

developed than its **tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it.** The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have

everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. **The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired;** but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. **Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.**

By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights

of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, **by controlling its**

MY COMMENT: China and many other countries hostile to rights and freedoms impose government despotism through enforcement of political ideologies adverse to freedoms such as freedom of speech by imposing a compulsory obedience to the despotic government's reign by oppression.

THE BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT is a government advocating and enforcing rights, freedoms, liberties, and their corresponding duties to preserve the General Welfare and Domestic Tranquility and cascading the protection and enforcement of the human right and duty to provide for the defense of a community with the right to keep and bear arms, otherwise known as the Common Defense thereby preserving Domestic Security.

effects.

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by **giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.**

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. **As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed.**

FALLIBLE REASONING: Improving truthful and effective reasoning is achieved as I proposed in ETHIC (18) PRESERVING THE GENERAL WELFARE (Original) above.

As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; **an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power**; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, **divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-**

operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most

ON THE POINT OF CONSEQUENCES CAUSED BY FACTIONS:

The behavior described above condemns the human race to forever repeat the errors of history (putting it mildly) because human emotions in any given immediate dispute where all logical reasoning and all lessons of history are ignored and forgotten in the immediacy of a dispute. This has happened repeatedly throughout history whether it is between two individuals, two groups, or two countries. **Is the human race condemned to this repetition of stupidity and arrogance when the lessons of history and God point to a better way of resolving disputes? The way of CRITICAL THINKING, OCCAM'S RAZOR, and the BUTTERFLY EFFECT from CHAOS THEORY applied to HUMAN BEHAVIOR, in theory, will ultimately and finally lead to PEACE ON EARTH.**

violent conflicts.

But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and

involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, **nay with greater reason**, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, **not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens?** And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.

It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all

without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.

The inference to which we are brought is, **that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.**

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum [*something desired as essential*] by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor

religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.

From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. **A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual.** Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.

The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens

elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. **On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people.** The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:

In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.

It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.

The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be

more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.

Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,—is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union

than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.

In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most

incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.

PUBLIUS.

Citing Heather A. Butler, *WHY DO SMART PEOPLE DO FOOLISH THINGS?* | *Intelligence is Not the Same as Critical Thinking—And the Difference Matters*, Scientific American | Behavior & Society, October 3, 2017:¹



Credit: Getty Images

The ability to think critically, on the other hand, has been associated with wellness and longevity. Though often confused with intelligence, critical thinking is not intelligence. Critical thinking is a collection of cognitive skills that allow us to think rationally in a goal-orientated fashion and a disposition to use those skills when appropriate. Critical thinkers are amiable skeptics. **They are flexible thinkers who require evidence to support their beliefs and recognize fallacious attempts to persuade them. Critical thinking means overcoming all kinds of cognitive biases (for instance, hindsight bias or confirmation bias).**

Critical thinking predicts a wide range of life events. In a series of studies, conducted in the U.S. and abroad, my colleagues and I have found that critical thinkers experience fewer bad things in life. We asked people to complete an inventory of life events and take a critical thinking assessment (the Halpern Critical Thinking Assessment). The critical thinking assessment measures five components of critical thinking skills, including verbal reasoning, argument analysis, hypothesis testing, probability and uncertainty, decision-making and problem-solving.

¹ <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-do-smart-people-do-foolish-things/>

The inventory of negative life events captures different domains of life such as academic (for example, “I forgot about an exam”), health (“I contracted a sexually transmitted infection because I did not wear a condom”), legal (“I was arrested for driving under the influence”), interpersonal (“I cheated on my romantic partner who I had been with for more than a year”), financial (“I have over \$5,000 of credit-card debt”), and so on. Repeatedly, we found that critical thinkers experience fewer negative life events. **This is an important finding because there is plenty of evidence that critical thinking can be taught and improved.**

Is it better to be a critical thinker or to be intelligent? My latest research pitted critical thinking and intelligence against each other to see which was associated with fewer negative life events. People who were strong on either intelligence or critical thinking experienced fewer negative events, **but critical thinkers did better.**

Intelligence and improving intelligence are hot topics that receive a lot of attention. **It is time for critical thinking to receive a little more of that attention.** Keith E. Stanovich wrote an entire book in 2009 about **WHAT INTELLIGENCE TESTS MISS. Reasoning and rationality more closely resemble what we mean when we say a person is smart** rather than spatial skills and math ability. Furthermore, improving intelligence is difficult. Intelligence is largely determined by genetics. **Critical thinking, though, can improve with training, and the benefits have been shown to persist over time. Anyone can improve their critical thinking skills. Doing so, we can say with certainty, is a smart thing to do.**

Citing Samuel Moyn, *RIGHTS VS. DUTIES: RECLAIMING CIVIC BALANCE*, Boston Review: A Political and Literary Forum, **Category: Philosophy and Religion**, May 16, 2016.²

In 1947 Julian Huxley, English evolutionary theorist and director-general of UNESCO, wrote Mohandas Gandhi to ask him to contribute an essay to a collection of philosophical reflections on human rights. Gandhi declined. “I learnt from my illiterate but wise mother,” he replied, “that all rights to be deserved and preserved came from duty well done. Thus the very right to live accrues to us only when we do the duty of citizenship of the world.”

Huxley should not have been surprised by the rejection. As far back as Hind Swaraj (1909), his masterpiece in political theory, Gandhi had bemoaned “the farce of everybody wanting and insisting on . . . rights, nobody thinking of . . . duty.” And during World War II, when another Englishman, H. G. Wells, solicited Gandhi’s support for his bill of rights defining war aims, the mahatma recommended that Wells write a cosmopolitan charter of duties instead—a statement of what citizens of the world owe to each other.

A few months after his exchange with Huxley, Gandhi was dead. Assassinated in January 1948, he did not live to see the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, passed by the United Nations General Assembly in December of the same year. In our age, in which human rights politics have finally come into their own, his emphasis on duties looks downright idiosyncratic.

Of course, the human rights revolution of the past few decades itself means that international law imposes a wide range of duties. Every right implies corresponding or “correlative” duties in order to see that right respected, protected, or fulfilled. And while international law has grown more successful at imposing duties on states, national schemes of

² <http://bostonreview.net/books-ideas/samuel-moyn-rights-duties>

rights protection go far further. It is easy to forget this important point, yet it hardly means that commitment to human rights translates into a widespread public discourse about, or political prominence of, duties.

So we are now very familiar with the claim that all humans everywhere have rights. But we are much less familiar with the notion that rights are protected by the fulfillment of duties. Thirty years ago, when the human rights movement was in its infancy, philosopher Onora O’Neill commented, “Although serious writing on human rights acknowledges that any right must entail correlative obligations, we find no Universal Declaration of Human Duties, and no international Human Obligations Movements.” This omission of duties might have grave consequences for rights protection itself. Consider that, from their president on down, few Americans seem to believe that a right to be free from torture might translate into a duty to prevent and punish torture.

Human rights wither without a language of duties.

More important, even the most generous attempts to protect the political and socioeconomic rights of individuals leave some duties of individuals to their own states and all humanity out of account, as well as some duties of states to one another. After all, not all duties that morality might impose follow from individual rights. If states have a duty to provide housing and food, do individuals have a duty to pay taxes to ensure it can do so? If inequality gallops locally and globally, is it best to frame the problem as an indirect violation of a right—there being no right to fair distribution—or as a rationale to impose on individuals, corporations, and states a duty to contribute to a just society? If the planet burns, is the remedy a personal right to a healthy environment or a collective duty to preserve the earth for future generations?

The answers to these questions are hardly obvious, but our ability to tackle them in the first place is depleted by our unbalanced understanding of moral and political discourse over time. That discourse once gave obligations their due. Unfortunately, while there has been great interest in the history of rights, no one has attempted to write the history of human duties. Even that phrase sounds strange. In particular, there is now a whole canon on the history of the internationalization of human rights since the middle of the twentieth century. But, to the best of my knowledge, there is not a single book on the history of duties, even though there clearly have been precedents, including Gandhi’s, for a theory of obligations that would accrue not just at the level of community or state but at that of the globe as a whole.

It turns out the West—and possibly the world at large—historically cultivated robust theories not only of governmental obligations toward individual rights, but also of individuals toward one another, citizens toward their governments, and rich states toward poor ones. Duties are not without their own baggage. But, compared to the well-excavated history of rights claims, the lesser-known history of duties provides a valuable starting point as we attend to urgent purposes in the world today.



For millennia, duties—or responsibilities, as we are more apt to call them now—were the main commitment of religious ethics and thus the centerpiece of the history of ethical culture. “Judaism knows not rights but duties,” founder of human rights law Louis Henkin explained, “and at bottom, all duties are to God. (If every duty has a correlative right, the right must be said to be in God!)” And in spite of its critique of Jewish “legalism,” Christianity, like Islam, similarly holds that the substance of moral teachings is some set of divinely decreed obligations, whether to God or to fellow human beings.

Just as important, duties have long been the central framework for Western ethical theory, in large part thanks to Cicero's textbook on practical ethics—*De Officiis*, routinely translated as *On Duties*—which, for hundreds of years, introduced the subject to young men. Enlightenment thinker Immanuel Kant provided a revolutionary foundation for morality: the freedom of people to choose their own ends. But when he lectured on practical ethics, his teaching took a familiar form, expounding a catalogue of duties. Many everyday bodies of law, such as tort law for the redress of private wrongs, have never dispensed with this premodern emphasis on duties.

The rise of the history of human rights in our time has sometimes distorted our perception of these antediluvian realities. Historians searching for early traces of the notion of rights in medieval, Reformation, or Enlightenment Christianity are at risk of sidelining these traditions' overwhelming emphasis on duties. The same observation applies to early modern ideas of natural law, which have long been credited as the basis of later natural rights. "The development of the notion of natural right was not central to early modern natural law," historian Knud Haakonssen argues. Instead, rights thinking "crops up as little more than floating islands" in the moral sea of duties. In the 1670s, before there were declarations of the rights of man and citizen, German moralist Samuel Pufendorf summed up the dominant focus of his era's political and legal thought in the title of his treatise *On the Duty of Man and Citizen*.

In response to the hegemony of ethical schools, religious traditions, and political authorities emphasizing obligations within stark hierarchies, a few Enlightenment political thinkers asserted the supremacy of rights. The goal of this shift toward rights was escape from the confinement of duty, and that was no doubt a good thing. Liberal insistence on freedom from God's enforcers, tradition's weight, and the state's prerogatives was a significant advance in history. The question was, after individual freedoms had been proclaimed and won, what would happen to the earlier public emphasis on duties? Would it simply disappear?




Appeals to rights famously justified Atlantic revolutions against political oppression. Those revolutions were subsequently domesticated through an appeal to duties. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789, and its even more liberal update of 1793, were answered by the conservative 1795 Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and Citizen. "The maintenance of society requires that those who compose it should both know and fulfill their duties," the document declared.

Discussion of duties did not persist, however, simply to contain the demand for rights. Instead, most nineteenth-century liberals assigned importance to duties themselves for two main reasons. First, they nestled their liberal political commitments within historical and sociological frameworks that made individual freedom a collective achievement that depended on ongoing collective commitments and necessarily common action. If liberals defended rights, it was not because they believed that individuals enjoyed perfect freedom in a mythical state of nature. Instead, rights, if plausible at all, were social entities—like everything else. The difference between good and bad states was not the distinction between those that respected the pre-political rights of the state of nature and those that did not. Rather, it was the difference between states that properly balanced social freedom with other collective purposes and those that did not.

Second, many liberals were concerned that when the state or globe was viewed as the forum for the protection of individual freedom alone, the result would be a destructive libertarianism that would sweep aside values other than individual liberty, including equality and fraternity. So their motivation to maintain the historic emphasis on duties in a liberal age

was powerful. Despots had always droned on about the duties of subjects to the state. But even as libertarianism rose, some nineteenth-century liberals elaborated the older republican idea that citizenship in a community of free people affords privileges but also incurs responsibilities.

Thomas Paine, who fanned the flames of the American Revolution and then participated in the French, offered a famous defense of *The Rights of Man* (1791). Nineteenth-century liberal and Italian patriot Giuseppe Mazzini, one of the most famous men of his age, titled his central volume of moral and political theory *The Duties of Man* (1860). For a long time, Mazzini's work was more emblematic of the tasks of social thought than was Paine's because Mazzini reclaimed duties for liberals.



Photograph of Giuseppe Mazzini:
Domenico Lama (1823–1890);
public domain

Mazzini was not a great philosopher, but his global influence was such that his ethics deserve a look. (Gandhi mentioned *The Duties of Man* as one of the texts that most inspired his own thought.) The priority accorded individual entitlements, Mazzini believed, risked prioritizing the hedonistic “pursuit of happiness” over other goods, neglecting both higher aims and the enacted communal fellowship necessary to achieve them.

Thus, he set himself the task of renovating the time-honored centrality of duties.

With the theory of happiness as the primary aim of existence, we shall only produce egoistic men. We have therefore to find a principle . . . which shall guide men toward their own improvement, teach them constancy and self-sacrifice, and unite them with their fellow men **And this principle is Duty.**

Though Mazzini is best remembered for his nationalism, he was also one of the earliest cosmopolitans, who believed in the eventual unification of humanity. What drove his activism at every scale, from his local agitation to his global vision, was his commitment to the reality of and need for social interdependence for the sake of achieving all goods. He sought a balance between individual emancipation and collective obligations.

Living as an exile in London for much of his adult life, Mazzini was aghast at the false contrast between rights and utility that he found dominating Anglophone ethics, as it still does today. He was angered by the isolating hedonism of the Enlightenment and Atlantic revolutions, and he saw Jeremy Bentham's principle of utility as no real alternative. For Mazzini viewed utilitarianism as itself a mode of individual rights, disavowing their formalism and substituting their foundations while centering ethics on the same atomized self. “I know that the theory of rights does not find favour with Bentham by name,” Mazzini allowed, in one of his more penetrating comments. “But for all who understand the spirit and not the mere dead letter of Bentham, this is evidently only a quarrel with the word.” For this reason, Mazzini contended, utilitarianism had merely saved human rights from their nonsensical illusions rather than embedding them in a doctrine that would encourage social interdependence: “Bentham's writings recognize no idea superior to the individual, no collective starting-point, no providential education of the human race.”

Because interdependence, for Mazzini, was the necessary precursor to social improvement, his doctrine of duties was exceptionally broad—irreducible, especially, to the state’s duties to respect the rights of its citizens. Rather, duties to one another and to all humanity put the relationship between individual rights and the state in its broader setting. “Workingmen, brothers—understand me well. When I say that the consciousness of your rights will never suffice to produce an important and lasting progress, I do not ask you to renounce those rights,” Mazzini assured his reader.

Mazzini found in duties the critical tool to immunize the individual liberty consecrated by

I merely say that such rights can only exist as a consequence of duties fulfilled, and that we must begin with the latter in order to achieve the former. . . . Hence, when you hear those who preach the necessity of a social transformation declare that they can accomplish it by invoking only your rights, be grateful to them for their good intentions, but distrustful of the outcome.

rights theory from the libertarian heresy that he found so destructive. “The sacred idea of

Some have reduced it to a narrow and immoral egoism, making the self everything, and declaring the aim of all social organization to be the satisfaction of personal desires. Others have declared that all government and all authority is a necessary evil [or] that government has no other mission than that of preventing one individual from harming another. Reject these false doctrines, my brothers! . . . If you were to understand liberty according to these flawed doctrines, you would deserve to lose it. . . . Your liberty will be sacred so long as it is guided by an idea of duty, of faith in common perfectibility.

Liberty has recently been perverted by some deeply flawed doctrines,” he noted.

Mazzini may have been unique in his sheer emphasis on the programmatic significance of duties. He was certainly more florid, as well as less philosophically rigorous, than many of his nineteenth-century contemporaries, even if he was both more globally minded and, for a long time, more globally influential. Yet he captured some commitments that other liberals shared. After its early naturalistic phase, liberalism shared with socialism a commitment to the collective foundations of the good life, in which individual liberty fit alongside universal emancipation and a range of other goods.

Perhaps most important, liberals evoked the complex interdependence of human beings in a way that rights talk risks obscuring, especially given its frequent allegiance to the defense of property. Admittedly, sometimes even progressive theorists took this argument too far, as the brilliant and neglected French legal theorist Léon Duguit did when, in the name of solidarity and social interdependence, he revived Auguste Comte’s claim that “there is only one right, and that is to do our duty.” Whatever the overstatement, the question such traditions leave behind is whether it is correct in our own day to renovate rather than reject an emphasis on duties, and to do so on the scale of global interdependence.



Though only their powerful traditions of rights and utility are familiar today, many Anglo-American liberals agreed with their Continental European colleagues about the need to emphasize a theory and practice of duties. Surely the best example is T. H. Green, the Oxford moralist who fused Evangelical religion, liberal politics, and Hegelian metaphysics. As his

biographer Melvin Richter explained, it was in some ways because Green felt he could count on secure English and Western European traditions of liberty that he could take the chance to justify a more interventionist state. Accordingly, Green named a major work *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation* (1885); in it he argued that personal entitlements should receive far less rhetorical attention than state and collective ones—precisely to support policies that would augment inherited rights with needed redistribution.

Like so many others in the nineteenth century—and not only those on the far left, such as Karl Marx—Green’s point of departure was an attack on the myth that the individual existed prior to, and in the absence of, society. “The popular effect of the notion that the individual brings with him into society certain rights,” Green complained, “is seen in the inveterate irreverence of the individual towards the state [and] in the assumption that he has rights against society irrespectively of his fulfillment of any duties to society.” Green did not reject rights, but he reframed them, reaching for a theory of rights that would acknowledge individual capacities while prioritizing social cohesion and progress. This meant, above all, an insistence that duties have the same standing and importance as rights: “There cannot be innate rights in any other sense than that in which there are innate duties.” Of these, he added, “much less has been heard.” That coda is even more appropriate today, in what Henkin calls the “age of rights.”

Green, British New Liberals, and their American analogues were arguing against a libertarian presumption whereby state intrusion into the allegedly free domain of market activity was a violation of rights. These thinkers directed their fire toward the conception of rights as metaphysical entities; instead, rights were social goods whose justification ultimately lay in collective purposes. Later, in the twentieth century, American legal realists such as Robert Hale and Karl Llewellyn pursued a similar deconstruction of rights. Though, in theory, the anti-metaphysical critique applied equally to duties, Green, his contemporaries, and their successors did not target duties for criticism, perhaps because they wanted in the first place to make duties plausible in an age in which liberty is used to justify market hierarchy and depredation. For such figures, the argument was thus twofold. First, if people have rights based on their innate features, they have innate duties too. Second, the collective setting of individual freedom makes the harmony of social and individual purposes a policy challenge. The presence of both purposes should not be an occasion for asserting the supremacy of individual freedom over the collective good and playing the trump card of rights to minimize the state.

The need to guard against destructive ideas of duty is a poor excuse for ignoring beneficial ones. [In original].

Green’s thought made possible the kind of liberalism on which the twentieth-century welfare state was based. The welfare state was popularly justified not in terms of rights—including economic rights—but individual and collective duties. The

1940s, when the United Nations’ Universal Declaration appeared, may in fact have been the high point for duties. There was Simone Weil’s “Declaration of Duties toward Mankind,” written in 1943 in London not long before her death by self-starvation. It is hazy but interesting, drawing on substantial talk within the French Resistance about the need for a fresh start for the sake of solidarity. And in 1948, a collection of mostly American intellectuals, meeting in Chicago after the war to draft a world constitution, began with a “Declaration of Duties and Rights,” for the sake not just of “physical welfare” but also of “spiritual excellence.” A late article of the Universal Declaration alludes to the importance of duties: “Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.” Latin Americans went further, entitling their regional charter, finalized in spring 1948, “The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.”

Today, however, liberal emphasis on duties is a distant memory at every scale. Political theory lost track of the concept in the second half of the twentieth century. Even communitarianism, with its concern for interdependence, does not carry the mantle; duty-oriented liberals understood social interdependence as the setting for personal freedoms, not a substitute for them. And these liberal theorists sometimes demanded responsibility not in local settings alone—as communitarians do—but at a global scale. In the public sphere, duties are similarly absent. Neither liberals in their domestic projects, nor the Universal Declaration and subsequent international movements, have successfully offered powerful public visions of social interdependence, collective agency, or planetary responsibility. section separator



Our age of rights, lacking a public language of duties, is a historical outlier. The consequences are significant. Human rights themselves wither when their advocates fail to cross the border into the language of duty; insofar as compliance with norms on paper is sought, the bearers of duties have to be identified and compelled to assume their burden. But duties may have an even larger role to play than simply completing the circuit of rights fulfillment. Though we face environmental catastrophe and the inequities of neoliberalism, few think to pick up the traces of Mazzini’s and Gandhi’s cosmopolitan responsibility, which might help to confront these global-scale menaces.

As Anne Peters has argued, international law in particular beckons for duties corresponding to the human rights established by the last generation’s work. Specifically, one might call for cosmopolitan responsibilities for the sake of the many to balance the transnational commercial freedoms that currently redound to the benefit of a few. Another forgotten tradition asserts cosmopolitan duties of states quite different from the now-familiar demand to save strangers from atrocities, as expressed by the famous doctrine of the “responsibility to protect.” This is the proposition that rich states owe duties to the world’s poor and the global commons. Indeed, progressive international lawyers have made repeated attempts to assert not rights of individuals but duties of states—including to one another in view of their unequal wealth and power. The most notable example is the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States (1974), propounded in close connection with the global South’s proposed New International Economic Order.

Of course, it would be a grievous mistake to insist, as both Mazzini and Gandhi apparently did, that enjoyment of rights ought to depend on assumption of duties first. And it is undeniable that the rhetoric of duties has often been deployed euphemistically by those whose true purpose is a return to tradition won by limiting the rights of others. The misbegotten “Asian values” debate of the 1990s, which saw Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and others contend that Western norms ran afoul of local visions, promoted duties as a surreptitious means of scanting rights. In 2007 British Labour Party Prime Minister Gordon Brown began calling for a new bill of rights and duties, which has escalated into full-scale resistance to human rights under his conservative successors. Claiming to complement rights with necessary “responsibilities,” Tories have proposed withdrawal from the country’s Human Rights Act amid anger at the notion that this “charter for terrorists” provides excessive protection for suspects. Most perniciously, when the language of duties has been revived, it has often been for the sake of libertarian ends, notably in debates over state provision—for example, in the longstanding critique of welfare, which holds that individuals are duty bound to cultivate personal virtue and take responsibility for their lives rather than depend selfishly on the “nanny state” to minister to their needs.

But it ought to be clear that the need to guard against destructive ideas of duty is a poor excuse for ignoring beneficial ~~liberal~~ ones. Indeed, rejecting duty entirely means rejecting a public vocabulary that might save a range of values from continuing neglect, whether socioeconomic equality, global justice, or environmental welfare.

Further, duties could matter precisely because many of our most intractable problems are global. In his letter to Huxley, Gandhi's call to prioritize duties reflected a self-conscious cosmopolitanism: duties are at the core of a worthy citizenship of the world. It is highly doubtful that human rights alone will address these public dilemmas in either theory or practice. In fact, they have already failed to do so.

The anxious sense that to legitimate talk of duty is to flirt with disaster—that, all things considered, it is best to stick exclusively to the vindication of hard-won rights—is understandable but indefensible. Above all, it is critical to ensure that the human rights revolution does not turn out to be a permanent fellow-traveler of a much larger libertarian revolution: disquietingly, the two share the same fifty-year lifespan.

Recent developments in human rights themselves suggest a parting of the ways. There is a growing realization among activists that talking the talk of other people's rights may lead inexorably to experiences of solidarity that, in turn, affect how claims are made. A self-styled human-obligations movement, of the kind that O'Neill called for long ago, would not only better capture some aspects of existing activism. It also would help dispel worries about its libertarian associations, particularly since northern activists have a continuing penchant for demoting economic and social rights and distributive justice in general in favor of classic concerns about, for example, censorship, imprisonment, and torture. Just as important, in recent years there has been a remarkable turn in northern advocacy toward building community relationships around the world before setting multifaceted agendas, rather than parachuting in for externally formulated quick fixes. For instance, the non-governmental organization Participation and the Practice of Rights wants to teach activists to help existing grassroots forces in the global South to help themselves.

From a different angle, a sense of duty is also implied by the push for "corporate social responsibility." Some worry that these efforts are oversold, window-dressing for profit won at the expense of other rights violations by poorly regulated companies. Such anxieties speak to the need for duties that go beyond insurance against the worst abuses; they must serve the pursuit of economic justice, not simply help businesses to advertise their ethical propriety.

There are good reasons, then, to ask what a history of human duties would look like, so we can decide whether and how to reestablish duties now. There will always be debate both about the source and substance of such duties. But this is no more true of duties than it is of the rights framework now impressively entrenched—along with the historical work that serves to vindicate it. As with rights, so with duties: reclaiming the history of duties is a first step toward the thinking and practice that might justifiably lead to reclaiming duties themselves.

Citing Sam Rosenfeld, ***POLITICS: It Takes Three (or More)*** | *To combat the new normal of two-party gridlock in U.S. politics, many call for more political parties. But what works in parliamentary governments might not help in our presidential system.* BOSTON REVIEW, A Political and Literary Forum, April 14, 2020

BREAKING THE TWO-PARTY DOOM LOOP: THE CASE FOR MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, Lee Drutman, Oxford University Press, \$27.95 (cloth)

"In any other country, Joe Biden and I would not be in the same party," Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez told NEW YORK MAGAZINE late last year. *"But in America, we are."* The democratic socialist's discomfort at sharing a party with centrist liberals captures the most common criticism of America's entrenched party duopoly: that it muzzles a diversity of political views. Dissident political movements across history—from Eugene Debs's socialists to Henry Wallace's anti-Cold War progressives, George Wallace's reactionary populists to Ralph Nader's Greens—**have long complained about the Tweedle Dee and Tweedle Dum of Republican and Democratic Party domination.**

Classic U.S. two-partyism appears to be hurtling the country over a precipice of constitutional crisis.

COUNTERPOINT: Blame the Democrats.

DON HAMRICK

Although that complaint has often come from the edges of the political spectrum, whether left or right, another venerable line of attack has come from would-be centrist White Knights. Lamenting polarized partisanship, they

call on common-sense moderates to come together to support solutions for the common good. And though such centrist efforts often take the practical form of a third-party movement, what they really represent is less advocacy for multiparty politics in the long-term than anti-partyism as a political ethic.

BREAKING THE TWO-PARTY DOOM LOOP, Lee Drutman's new brief for multipartyism in America, falls squarely outside of both of these traditions. A political scientist and fellow at the NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, Drutman is neither a radical nor a pox-on-both-houses centrist, but rather a **perfectly mainstream liberal**. He's also—blessedly—no anti-party man, insisting explicitly and repeatedly that parties perform the essential task of structuring conflict in politics, and that "stronger political parties make for stronger democracy." The core motivation driving his case for **transformative electoral reform** is less utopian than restorative—a small-c conservative desire to bring some stability and functionality back to the political system. In the face of hoary myths about the chronic instability of multiparty systems, Drutman synthesizes reams of comparative scholarship to show that, in fact, they more often than not inculcate norms of compromise and incrementalism—**while classic U.S. two-partyism appears to be hurtling the country over a precipice of constitutional crisis.**

The **bulk of the book** offers a sweeping account of the origins and dynamics of contemporary party polarization, showing how the **interplay between disciplined partisan warfare and a deliberately fragmented constitutional structure has now locked U.S. politics into a rolling crisis with "no mechanism for self-correction."** It's as a last-ditch effort to break this dynamic that Drutman champions reforms that would lead to more parties. He insists that **both the origins and potential solutions to the crisis are fundamentally institutional in nature—stemming from the rules of U.S. politics and the organizations that engage them.**

Ultimately, **Drutman is not convincing that his chosen reform would work as he envisions.** But the journey he takes us on to reach his prescription provides a compelling

portrait of the political death spiral in which we find ourselves trapped. “Time is precious,” he concludes, opting for a tone of maximalist panic. “The levees have broken. We cannot take buckets to the flood anymore.” I have my doubts that multipartyism provides the life raft we need to escape Drutman’s two-party doom loop. But I do get the “doom” part.



Targeting the two-party system to address our current crisis might seem odd at first blush. After all, our party duopoly is nearly as old as the country itself, while our politics appears to have gone haywire—in Drutman’s sense, at least—only much more recently. Why blame the duopoly?

Channeling the work of political scientist Frances Lee, Drutman terms the new dynamic “pendulum politics”—a perpetual scrimmage over the tantalizing moving target of majority control.

In a brisk but vivid historical tour, Drutman argues that the formal continuity of the two-party system actually masks a more fluid and fragmented dynamic in U.S. party politics up until a few decades ago. He channels the late historian and political scientist James MacGregor Burns in identifying a “four-party system” throughout the postwar era, with both parties containing bona fide conservative and liberal factions: conservative and liberal Republicans, conservative and liberal Democrats. Those intraparty divides obscured interparty distinctiveness. But that blurriness also enabled shifting bipartisan coalitions to legislate on a continuing, incremental basis, while keeping institutional power in Congress decentralized among committee chairs and policy entrepreneurs unburdened by heavy-handed party leaders.

This arrangement wouldn’t—probably couldn’t—last. Since southern white Democrats were central to this system, sustaining it required **keeping civil rights off the forefront of political conflict**. The black freedom struggle, aided by the broader agitation of northern Democratic liberals, finally made that impossible. In the later 1960s and 1970s there followed a related, rolling array of newly salient culture-war battles. In the maelstrom, the group coalitions of the two parties scrambled, then sorted. By the 1980s, a self-perpetuating dynamic of party polarization—driven by both group identity and ideology—had locked into place. Racially and culturally conservative white Democrats, especially but not only in the South, decamped to the GOP. Through a parallel but more purposeful and thoroughgoing process, the conservative movement consolidated control of the Republican Party and muzzled its moderates.

Throughout this period, politics grew increasingly nationalized: national party allegiances came more and more to determine down-ballot choices in state and local races. As a result, the two parties entered a prolonged phase of electoral parity at the federal level, to an extent unseen in over a century. That put control of major parts of the government in plausible contention every election cycle, and ideological sorting ratcheted up the stakes of losing control. Channeling the work of political scientist Frances Lee, Drutman terms the new dynamic “pendulum politics”—a perpetual scrimmage over the tantalizing moving target of majority control. Under competitive pressure, he writes, “parties have sharpened their rhetoric and waged more emotionally performative battles.” This in turn has made “cross-partisan compromise even more unlikely. . . . Electioneering takes over. Governance recedes.” Rinse and repeat.

Drutman is a nimble chronicler of this doom loop’s historical origins; only occasionally does he lapse into reductionism or misguided shorthand. (An “Old Left” really did once exist, for example, but it most certainly did not include “big city bosses and police.”) To convey what is genuinely novel about two-party dynamics in their current form, he would have benefited

from widening his historical frame to include the nineteenth century, encompassing what historians call the “Party Period” in U.S. politics. The parties dominated electoral politics and governance more comprehensively between the 1830s and the 1890s than any time before or since, and we can see in those decades long stretches of vigorous party competition sustaining system-wide stability—as well as a descent into catastrophic civil war. His more proximate account nevertheless gives us what we need to understand how the ingredients of contemporary political conflict have acted like a toxic solvent on the functioning of government.

For Drutman, both the origins and potential solutions to the crisis are fundamentally institutional in nature—stemming from the rules of U.S. politics and the organizations that engage them.

Once you’re locked in a doom loop of polarized party competition, the temptation to manipulate procedural democracy to secure victory grows powerful, as does the logic used to justify it. National and state governments alike engage in high-stakes brinkmanship and skullduggery: voter ID laws and other procedural hurdles to voting, envelope-pushing efforts by lame-duck legislatures to strip powers from incoming officials of the opposite party, and increasingly explicit partisan justifications for aggressive gerrymandering. “As the country pulls apart, the stakes of each election rise,” Drutman summarizes. **“As the stakes rise, the fighting toughens. As the fighting toughens, it becomes harder to agree on what’s fair.” Ominously, just such breakdowns in shared norms about what constitutes political fair play have accompanied major episodes of democratic backsliding in other countries.**

It should be noted—and Drutman does—that Republicans have occupied the vanguard of contemporary efforts to push the procedural envelope. But liberals, with a long tradition of procedural reformism, have recently taken an interesting turn in their thinking about rules and institutions. Polarized conflict with the GOP has sensitized many Democratic activists and operatives to the myriad ways that the political system impedes majoritarian progressive politics. Many now embrace a much more aggressive and radical set of reform prescriptions: call it **goo-goo hardball**. Proposals not merely to undo the Senate filibuster or curb gerrymandering but also **to end lifetime tenure for Supreme Court justices, pack federal courts, scrap the Electoral College, admit new states into the union, and effectively abolish the Senate have entered both public and intellectual discussion with new force. There are sound small-d democratic arguments for all of these reforms. But the partisan impetus behind their newfound currency is obvious. The title of political scientist David Faris’s recent book-length case for maximalist procedural warfare captures the inexorable logic of party politics caught in a doom loop: It’s Time to Fight Dirty.**



Drutman has his own radical procedural fix to sell, but with a difference. He sees his prescription as an escape hatch out of the doom loop rather than a tool to aid one side in the party war.

In the face of myths about the chronic instability of multiparty systems, Drutman shows that, in fact, they more often than not inculcate norms of compromise and incrementalism.

Drutman only recently came to embrace multiparty democracy as the solution. Throughout 2016, he predicted that Trump’s rise would initiate a classic realignment of the two-party system around a new cosmopolitan-versus-traditionalist cultural divide. The transition to that new alignment would, he argued, depolarize policymaking for a time by reviving hidden and informal “four-party”-style coalitions. Trumpist Republicans and Sanders-style left populists might collaborate on economic and trade legislation, while upscale Republicans and cosmopolitan Democrats ally on immigration, reproductive rights, and

environmental policy. That prediction has not held water, of course. Three and half years into Trump's presidency, bipartisan coalitions like these are nowhere to be found. Party attachments have proven far stickier than Drutman (and others) imagined or hoped. Within the GOP, moreover, plutocratic economic interests have shown no sign of reevaluating their partnership with the ethno-nationalist populism that mobilizes the votes they need to pursue their agenda. Now that the chances of a two-party shakeup look virtually nil, Drutman looks to multiparty democracy as a Hail Mary pass to save the political system.

Is breaking the party duopoly feasible, even in the abstract? It can seem as natural, and unmovable, as bedrock. "The two-party system," political scientist Clarence Berdahl wrote in 1951, "is so much a part of our governmental and political structure that it need not be argued, nor explained, nor even understood; it is, like the Constitution and the Monroe Doctrine, something we accept as a matter of course." However well ensconced in the political culture it may be, Drutman is right to insist that the system owes its tenacity not primarily to Americans' behavior or preferences but rather to a core set of electoral rules.

Every congressional district selects one House representative, just as every state in a given election cycle selects one senator and the country writ large selects one president. Each one of these positions is filled through plurality elections: whoever gets the most votes wins. (The Electoral College complicates matters when it comes to presidential selection, but the same principle applies to state-level presidential voting.) In such contests, multicandidate fields can produce perverse outcomes: the least liked candidate may be victorious if relatively likeminded voters split their choices. Voters thus have an incentive to avoid such "spoiler" effects, as do potential candidates themselves. Over time, these strategies stabilize into regular two-sided contests in every election.

The axiom that democracies with single-member districts and plurality elections produce stable two-party systems is known as Duverger's Law, after French scholar Maurice Duverger. (It's a testament to Drutman's commitment to accessibility that he never uses Duverger's name in the book, but he does explicate the law through a description of a Simpsons episode.) The U.S. political system further entrenches the party duopoly through state governments' administration of primary elections and control over inclusion on election ballots. But the core of the matter is the single-member plurality rules.

Drutman targets his prescriptions accordingly. He calls on Congress to pass a law mandating multimember ranked-choice voting for selecting House members—assigning more than one representative for each district—as well as single-member ranked-choice voting for choosing senators. The ranked-choice method asks voters to list their candidate preferences in order. (In single-member contests, if no candidate gets a majority, the lowest ranked candidates get eliminated and their voters' second choices are awarded the votes. The process is repeated until someone garners a majority.) Such a process does away with the strategic voting that encourages two-party contests. At the same time, it incentivizes parties to select candidates with broad appeal rather than simply those that will stoke their bases.

Some of the benefits that Drutman attributes to multipartyism would seem to depend on parliamentary presumptions.

Drutman's proposed multimember House districts—complemented by an additional prescription to enlarge the size of the chamber itself—would introduce what is known as "proportional representation" into the U.S. legislature. Whatever the number of representatives in each district (Drutman suggests five), the top-ranked choices from the voting process would get that many seats. The candidates would be grouped by party on the ballot, allowing for party-line voting and for the allocation of seats to parties proportional to their voter

support. This, in turn, would further encourage the emergence of stable multiparty democracy. Since cohesive political factions would be able to institutionalize themselves as competitive parties in such a system, Drutman also suggests doing away with congressional primaries, which weaken parties organizationally. As for presidential elections, in the absence of either an unlikely constitutional amendment or the success of the “state compact” workaround to undo the Electoral College, Drutman calls on states to allocate their electoral votes via ranked-choice voting.

It’s not until quite far into his book that Drutman lays out his full case for why the reforms he proposes, and the multiparty system he expects them to facilitate, would solve our political crisis. **He dutifully pays heed to the most “obvious” benefit of multiparty democracy—that it increases “diversity of representation”—before moving to the core of the matter.** Even though multipartyism enables parties to be more ideologically cohesive and differentiated in their electoral appeals, it has a track record of relatively consensual and stable governance. Elections in multiparty settings—which are, to be clear, the norm rather than the exception among developed democracies, from Australia to Sweden to Germany—tend to feature less negative campaigning and a greater focus on policy. Most importantly, the system “regularizes compromise and coalition building” as a built-in expectation of politics, since a single party rarely if ever wins an outright majority.

This expectation colors every aspect of the electoral process. “If voters learn what politics should be about through electoral campaigns,” Drutman argues, multiparty and two-party democracy communicate different messages. Multiparty democracy communicates that democracy is about building coalitions and alliances. Two-party democracy communicates that democracy is about the true majority triumphing.

Moreover, in the worst-of-both-worlds U.S. case, aggressive majoritarianism and the all-or-nothing qualities of our contemporary electoral appeals coincide with a uniquely fragmented and veto-laden legislative process, in which legislative minorities can and do frequently block any policy from even happening. **Locked in a polarized power struggle, Americans yearn continuously for the catharsis of victory—but get deadlock instead.**



That deadlock brings us to a weakness in Drutman’s argument. He is right that the proximate driver of the legislative stalemates, government shutdowns, and recurring crises we see in U.S. politics is an institutional problem. But two-partyism may not be the key institution. **Drutman’s account underplays the effects of another structure that puts the United States among a global minority of democracies: the separation of powers, otherwise known as presidentialism.** Most democracies are parliamentary systems: governments are formed by legislative majorities, and the chief executive does not have a separate electoral connection to voters. Without separate executive and legislative branches, there’s no possibility of “divided government,” with opposing party coalitions controlling coequal parts of the government simultaneously. If the governing coalition can’t hold itself together, it dissolves and a new election is held. Some of the benefits that Drutman attributes to multipartyism would seem to depend on parliamentary presumptions.

In a multiparty democracy, plutocrats might still prefer the policy stasis born of gridlock to some consensual compromise—and the separation of powers is what would enable them to get it.

Consider the language Drutman uses to depict the smoother sailing of multiparty democracy in his hypothesized alternative. Smaller parties—a MAGA party, a Bloombergian

neoliberal party, a Sanders left party, and so on—would first be able to make coherent electoral appeals, but would then turn around and “bargain with each other” when in power, “because they have to in order to govern.” Much hinges on that “have to.” The words have real meaning in a parliamentary system, where a governing coalition would dissolve in the face of a deadlock and have to call new elections. But a presidential system allows for sustained, grinding periods of gridlock and stasis when different parties control different branches simultaneously. (Look around!) Would fragmenting the legislature even further with more parties grease the wheels of negotiation and bargaining—or merely add new means and motivation for minorities to grind policymaking to a halt?

The record of multipartyism in presidential systems—a combination most commonly seen in Latin America—gives some cause for concern. Presidents, unlike prime ministers, don’t represent multiparty coalitions. Facing multiparty legislatures in which a majority of members are not of their party, presidents often struggle to build support for their agenda. Besides gridlock, this can lead to presidents aggrandizing powers to their office, or else buying legislative support via large-scale corruption. Drutman addresses the conventional scholarly skepticism of multiparty presidentialism, pointing out that more recent Latin American experience has been more encouraging, and emphasizing that gridlock is already a problem for two-party presidentialism in any case. That’s true, but it does little to assuage suspicions that our fragmented constitutional structure, rather than our party system, lies at the heart of our current crisis.

I suspect that Drutman’s electoral reforms would mark a net improvement over the status quo in terms of both normative democracy and governance. But much would depend on how a shakeup of the institutional landscape of politics might affect the strategies of its organized players. Think back, for example, to those moneyed elites hitching their regressive economic agenda to the coattails of Trumpian populism, and thwarting the party realignment that Drutman had heralded four years ago. It’s true that, in a multiparty context, the party of Trump would no longer need to be the party of Koch. But those plutocrats might still prefer the policy stasis born of gridlock to some consensual compromise—and the separation of powers is what would enable them to get it.



Even if Drutman falls short in clinching his prescriptive case, he succeeds fully in forcing the question. If multiparty democracy is not the answer to the crisis he conveys with such sweep and clarity, then what is?

Just as importantly, Drutman never fails to keep front and center his commitment to parties as bedrock features of electoral democracy. Given that real-world proponents of reforms such as ranked-choice voting include many advocates interested in weakening and decentering parties from politics rather than shifting to multipartyism, Drutman’s insistence that “the antiparty vision belongs to the dustbin of history” poses an important challenge. Parties perform tasks in electoral democracies that no other institutions do—organizing and channeling conflict, mobilizing citizens and connecting them to government, policing the boundaries of acceptable political participation. Contemporary political pathologies arguably stem as much from serious weaknesses plaguing the major parties—hindering their ability to carry out those democratic tasks—as from the virulent strength of mass partisanship.

Here’s to the improved health of the parties, however many we end up with.

Citing Christal Hayes, ALABAMA REPUBLICANS ARE URGING REP. ILHAN OMAR'S EXPULSION FROM CONGRESS, USA TODAY, August 27, 2019:³

WASHINGTON – Alabama's Republican Party is calling for its congressional delegation to have Rep. Ilhan Omar, a freshman lawmaker, prominent progressive and one of the first two Muslim women ever elected to Congress, removed from the House of Representatives.

A resolution calling for the launch of expulsion proceedings got the stamp of approval from the state's Republican party at a retreat over the weekend in Auburn, according to AL.com. The resolution cites a number of comments Omar has made about terrorists and Israel that sparked controversy throughout the last several months, including remarks that were denounced by even some Democrats as playing into anti-Semitic tropes.

“Rep. Omar has engaged in rhetoric that explicitly runs counter to American values and patriotism,” the resolution reads. “The Alabama Republican Party urges its elected congressional delegation to proceed with the expulsion process in accordance to Article 1, Section 5 of the U.S. Constitution to expel Rep. Ilhan Omar from the United States House of Representatives.”

Any effort to have Omar expelled would have no chance of being taken up in the Democratic-controlled House. To be expelled from Congress, at least two-thirds of the House would have to approve of the measure — a tough feat for Republicans who control 197 seats out of all 435.

Tzemach Yehudah Richter, Ilhan Omar – The Uncovered Cover-Up, The Times of Israel | The Blogs, March 29, 2020, THE TIMES OF ISRAEL DISCLAIMER: Please note that the posts on The Blogs are contributed by third parties. The opinions, facts and any media content in them are presented solely by the authors, and neither The Times of Israel nor its partners assume any responsibility for them.

YOUTUBE VIDEO: MUSLIM EXPOSING THE DANGER OF ILHAN OMAR & CAIR'S AGENDA | Dalia al-Aqidi | POLITICS | Rubin Report [https://youtu.be/d9zvQWHqOg]

Dave Rubin of THE RUBIN REPORT talks to Dalia al-Aqidi (Journalist, Republican Candidate) about why she is challenging Rep Ilhan Omar for her congressional seat in the fifth district of Minnesota. Dalia is a Muslim refugee who grew up in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. She describes how she immigrated to the US when she was 20 and was welcomed by America. She shares her concerns about groups like CAIR (Council on American-Islamic Relations) and how they worked with and groomed congresswomen Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib. She reveals how CAIR is a front for the Muslim Brotherhood and is working to train many more candidates in the same progressive mold. Daila also describes why the term islamophobia is deployed as a tactic to silence critics. She describes how she is immune to Ilhan Omar's identity politics because she is also a Muslim immigrant. Because

³ <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/08/27/alabama-gop-rep-ilhan-omar-expulsion-congress/2135327001/>

of this she has the ability to ask Omar about her connections to Recep Tayyip Erdogan the President of Turkey, as well as CAIR and the Muslim Brotherhood. She also details some of the absurd lies of Ilhan Omar such as the time she voted against a Somali aid package, but then praised the bill in a press conference after the vote. Dalia also shares her concerns about the reputations of good, hard working Muslim immigrants in the US being damaged by the policies and actions of Ilhan Omar. Dalia also gives her take on some of the accusations against Ilhan Omar including the federal investigation into the possibility that she committed immigration fraud. Dalia also shares how she is deeply concerned about the identity politics that are being used on the left because she feels that it only breeds more hatred and division in America.

For more than one year, since my Blogging began at TOI I have followed a variety of stories, but the most dominant one has obviously been involving Minnesota's 5th District House Seat.

The main motivation I had in writing so many articles related to this district was because my first hand experiences justified telling the truth rather than keeping quiet while Omar continued to lie. As time went by, the truth began to surface about Ilhan Omar.

Minnesota State Representative Steve Drazkowski requested investigations be made on Omar based upon documentation he had gathered. As reported by Alpha News in a story dated January 18, Drazkowski drew upon David Steinberg's work at PJ Media and on Power Line. David is of course the genius researcher who has established himself as the foremost investigative reporter on Omar's tangled life.

As I previously mentioned, in mid – 2019, Glenn Beck of Blaze TV did an extensive investigation on Omar's family and marriage history which appeared on a program called – "Ilhan Omar: All In The Family". Beck used a chalkboard to illustrate the complicated family and marriage relationship Omar had.

As all of this information became public knowledge, Omar was questioned on these allegations and repeatedly refused to respond to the media to clarify these facts.

Then in mid-August, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu banned Omar from entering Israel with Rashida Tlaib, due, to the fact that Miftah was sponsoring their trip, which is headed by Hanan Ashrawi, who has been known to have close ties to Yasser Arafat and terrorist organizations.

All House of Representative lawmakers stand for re-election every two years, which means that Omar will have to win re- election for her district in November if she wants to retain her seat.

Dalia al-Aqidi Has Announced Her Intention To Run Against Omar

Dalia is a relatively new face in Minnesota's Fifth District, but she is no stranger to the Middle East. She was born in Iraq and had to live under the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein.

From her campaign Website, we learn that –

Dalia al-Aqidi currently serves as a senior international political talk show host with over three decades of reporting from the capital cities of the Middle East to the U.S. She has written, produced, and hosted live shows on TV and radio in both English and Arabic. Over the course of her career, she has interviewed a variety of world leaders, such as former President Jimmy Carter, First Lady Barbara Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and many government leaders in the Middle East. She most recently worked as a news analyst in addition to anchoring a political talk show about U.S. policies and strategies in North Africa.

I see that she is gaining more media coverage as she campaigns to unseat Ilhan Omar. There is much more to say about this, however, I feel that before I continue any further, I want you all to look at the accompanying video which shows Dalia being interviewed on the Rubin Report.

This hour-long discussion will give you a very good idea of who Dalia is and what she represents.

Key Points Raised During the Interview-

At the beginning of each line, a number will first appear which indicates the number of minutes into the video this is mentioned-

25 – In 2020 CAIR has been grooming more than 120 (similar to) Rashida (Tlaib), Ilhan (Omar)

32 – 33 Her Hijab is not the correct Hijab to wear. Dalia spoke to several Americans from Somalia and hers is not the correct Muslim Hijab. She should not be showing her chest and be dressed more modestly.

36 Muslim Brotherhood is using the far left for their own agenda. Regarding BDS, if you are American and worried about what is happening in that region (Middle East) in general, you would want to defend and be close to your closest allies, which in this region is Israel. Who is going to counter Iran's influence in the region? Nobody (else)

People of Omar's district want to have a better life and a safe district, according to what Dalia has heard from the people there.

Omar has a brother who was in the UK. Omar's friends went on record saying, her brother was there so she decided to bring him to the US to be within the Somali community. Because he was not an American citizen he could not live in the US, so Omar married him and that is how he got his citizenship.

The Muslim Brotherhood is a terrorist group and when I get elected I am determined to get the Muslim Brotherhood designated as a terrorist group.

Regarding "some people did something", Dalia says "some people are going to do something" that will make her a one term congresswoman.

54 In Gaza, Hamas rules everything. Hamas brings a truck in the middle of a residential area to launch missiles and leave a minute later. Israel then naturally launches a counter attack and who would die, of course the civilian residents of Gaza. So those residents are sick and tired of this.

Omar is calling for less police presence in the district while crime rates are soaring sky high.

In Summary-

I feel that the interview appearing on the Rubin Report gives a good indication of what Omar is now up against.


With Omar unwilling to answer the many questions about her family and personal life, it should be quite obvious to everyone that Dalia represents someone who will work for the residents of her district.

And considering that the voters of Omar's district voted for Biden, rather than Bernie Sanders, gives all of us a good indication that Omar will have trouble retaining her seat in the November elections.

There are more subjects I would like to discuss in future Blogs which came out of this highly informative interview.



Corey Brooks, **WHAT CAN THE COLLAPSE OF THE WHIG PARTY TELL US ABOUT TODAY'S POLITICS? Is the Republican party on the verge of catastrophe? Probably not, if history is any indicator**, SmithsonianMag.com, April 12, 2016:⁴



In the midst of this tumultuous campaign season, the long, stable two-party system appears to be fraying at the seams. **The Republican establishment's struggle to reconcile the rise of Donald Trump with its own attempts at retaking the White House serves as a reminder that political institutions are not necessarily permanent. Major political parties can and have collapsed in the United States.**

Pundits on sites such as Esquire and Salon find **an intriguing precedent in the rapid demise of the Whig party in the middle of the 19th century. From**

FAKE NEWS ALERT: It is the **Left-Wing Socialist-leaning Democrat Party that are facing extinction** like Lemmings running off a cliff without their **CLIFF NOTES** explaining the reasons for the loyalty to the **GUARANTEE OF A REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT** in the **UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION** and what it means. From a Psychiatrist and a Psychologist perspective it is my layman's supposition that the Democrat Leadership (an Oxymoron), naming Nancy Pelosi, Adam Schiff who is a spineless pencil neck up Schiff Creek without a paddle or a gavel, because Jerrold Nadler has the gavel, are mentally unstable with **TRUMP DERANGEMENT SYNDROME**. THAT, by definition in the **DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th Edition)** is **OPPOSITIONAL DEFIANT DISORDER (ODD)** with **HISTRIONICS** and being a **PATHOLOGICAL NARCISSIST** with a **SUPERIORITY COMPLEX** that should disqualify the afflicted Democrats from holding any office in the federal government. We should should be so lucky to be rid of the Democrat Party.

⁴ <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/what-can-collapse-whig-party-tell-us-about-todays-politics-180958729/>

the early 1830s well into the mid-1850s, the Whigs joined the Democrats as one of the nation's two major parties. As late as the winter of 1853, a Whig president, Millard Fillmore of New York, occupied the White House. But two years later, **by the fall of 1855, the Whig party was effectively extinct.** Clearly, dramatic change in American party politics can happen fast, but is that kind of transformation happening today with the G.O.P.?

Probably not. Looking back, the underlying causes of the Whig party's downfall seem so much graver than today's turmoil, noteworthy as it has been.

The major American political realignment of the mid-1850s had been brewing for decades due to fundamental divisions over the place of slavery in American politics. By the late 1830s a small and radical group of abolitionists had become fed up with the two major parties, the Whigs and Democrats. Both systematically downplayed slavery, opting instead to spar over seemingly unrelated issues including taxation, trade policy, banking and infrastructure spending.

Abolitionists, by contrast, insisted that those issues were secondary to combatting the southern "slave power's" control of federal policymaking. Antislavery third parties (the abolitionist Liberty Party from 1840 to 1848 and the more moderate antislavery Free Soil Party from 1848 to 1854) relentlessly attacked the major parties' **inherent incapacity to offer meaningful policy outcomes on their central issue.** These activists fought fiercely, and ultimately successfully, **to demolish the existing party system,** seeing it (correctly) as overly protective of the slave states' political power. As the slavery issue grew increasingly salient in the face of rapid national expansion, so did disputes over slavery's place in new western territories and conflicts over fugitive slaves. The old issues began to matter less and less to average northern Whig voters.

The 1852 election was a disaster for the Whigs. In the vain hope of once more bridging the widening sectional rift, the party crafted a measured, proslavery platform distasteful to many northern Whigs, thousands of whom simply stayed home on Election Day. Two years later, when Congress passed divisive legislation that could introduce slavery into Kansas, the teetering Whig party came tumbling down. **A new coalition that combined most of the Free Soil Party, a majority of northern Whigs, and a substantial number of disgruntled northern Democrats came together to form the Republican party.** In less than two years, this grand, and not-at-all-old, party emerged as the most popular political party in the North, electing the Speaker of the House in February of 1856 and winning 11 of 16 non-slaveholding states in the presidential contest later that year.

The one policy goal that united all Republicans was opposition to the expansion of slavery, though there were a host of other issues that this Republican Party also coalesced behind (including, ironically, many former Whigs' disgust at the growing "problem" of Irish Catholic immigrants). Abolitionists had long argued that the southern states unfairly controlled the national government and needed to be stopped from further extending slavery's reach. Finally, after more than 20 years of agitation, the new Republican Party organized around precisely this agenda. Just a few years prior, such developments would have been almost completely unimaginable to all but the

most prescient antislavery political spokesmen. **Party systems can indeed collapse with stunning rapidity.**

When the Whig Party crumbled and northern Democrats split in the mid-1850s, it was because both of those old parties had failed to respond to the threat of slavery's expansion, which was fast becoming the major national issue—one which many Northerners had come to care more deeply about than any other policy question. The collapse of the Whig Party in the 1850s created national chaos, and ultimately civil war, but for many Americans the risk was worth it because of their insistence that slavery's expansion be stopped. With so many matters facing voters today, from national security concerns to economic anxieties to fears about illegal immigration, it's unlikely that there's any single issue that diverges radically enough from current partisan divisions and generates sufficiently intense ideological commitments to bring about an analogous upheaval in modern national politics.

Whether or not Donald Trump's campaign continues to confound the political class in the coming months, his **disaffected supporters** have provided a potent reminder that nothing in politics is guaranteed.

FAKE NEWS ALERT CONFIRMED: Trump supporters are NOT disaffected. Democrat supporters are the disaffected ones. The Democrat and their news media Praetorian Guards deploy blame-shifting tactic to pull the wool of deception over the American people.

DON HAMRICK

This is adapted from an essay originally published on History News Network.