THE LAW IN QUESTION: Seamen’s Suit, 28 U.S.C. § 1916: “In all courts of the United States, seamen may institute and prosecute suits and appeals in their own names and for their own benefit for wages or salvage or the enforcement of laws enacted for their health or safety without prepaying fees or costs or furnishing security therefor.” 
FIRST SUPPOSITION: A civil lawsuit by a seaman brought against the United States and members of the U.S. Coast Guard and members of other agencies of the United States Government for Second Amendment rights of U.S. seamen aboard U.S. flag vessels to defend against pirates on the high seas and for Second Amendment rights of U.S. seamen as a class of citizens (the just tertii doctrine) in intrastate and interstate travel (National Open Carry) qualifies for the Seamen’s Suit exemption of filing fees and costs (costs to include PACER’s Online Docket Access fees) under the safety clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1916. TRUE! 
SECOND SUPPOSITION: U.S. seamen are wards of the Admiralty Court. TRUE! 
THIRD SUPPOSITION: The District Courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States for any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) and under Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and under the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. TRUE! 
FOURTH SUPPOSITION: There is no explicit private right of action in the Seamen’s Suit, 28 U.S.C. § 1916. TRUE! 
FIFTH SUPPOSITION: There is an implied private right of action in the Seamen’s Suit, 28 U.S.C. § 1916 by the phrase “seamen may institute and prosecute suits.” TRUE!  
Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)

Under Justice Brennan’s Four-Point Test in Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), I have the right and the power to privately enforce the Seamen’s Suit Law 28 U.S.C. § 1916 by exercising the common law right of citizen’s arrest as affirmed by the statutory right under DC Code, § 23.582(b)(1)(A) Arrests Without Warrant by Other Persons).

In Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), “Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, offered a four-point test for determining whether courts could infer a power of private enforcement from a statute that did not expressly address the issue.” In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. Stylizing the text from Paul B. Stephan in Section III Private Enforcement of Federal Statutes: An Evolving Jurisprudence in Private Remedies for Treaty Violations After SANCHEZ-LLAMAS, 11 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 65 (2007) (available online at

I present Justice Brennan’s four-point test here with answers to my particularized situation:

TEST (1): “[am I, as the plaintiff] “one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,”— that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?”

ANSWER(1): Yes. I am a merchant seaman. The Seamen’s Suit Law, 28 U.S.C. § 1916 is specificly directed to merchant seamen.

TEST (2): “[Is] there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?”

ANSWER(2): Citing Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 782-784 (1952):

Whenever congressional legislation in aid of seamen has been considered here since 1872, this Court has emphasized that such legislation is largely remedial and calls for liberal interpretation in favor of the seamen. The history and scope of the legislation is reviewed in Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 727 -735 (1943), and notes. “Our historic national policy, both legislative and judicial, points the other way [from burdening seamen]. Congress has generally sought to safeguard seamen’s rights.” Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 246 (1942). “[T]he maritime law by inveterate tradition has made the ordinary seaman a member of a favored class. He is a ‘ward of the admiralty,’ often ignorant and helpless, and so in need of protection against himself as well as others. . . . Discrimination may thus be rational in respect of remedies for wages.” Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 162 (1934); Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 375, 377 (1932); Wilder v. Inter-Island Navigation Co., 211 U.S. 239, 246-248 (1908); Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169 (1903); Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 155-157 (1899). “The ancient characterization of seamen as wards of admiralty’ is even more accurate now than it was formerly.” Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 287 (1897); 5 Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. No. 6,047, 2 Mason (Cir. Ct. Rep.) 541, 556.

 Statutes which invade the common law or the general maritime law are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident. No rule of construction precludes giving a natural meaning to legislation like this that obviously is of a remedial, beneficial and amendatory character. It should be interpreted so as to effect its purpose. Marine legislation, at least since the Shipping Commissioners Act of June 7, 1872, 17 Stat. 262, should be construed to make effective its design to change the general maritime law so as to improve the lot of seamen. “The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed does not require such an adherence to the letter as would defeat an obvious legislative purpose or lessen the scope plainly intended to be given to the m.easure.” Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640 (1900); Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 437 (1907), 440. The direction of the current of maritime legislation long has been evident on its face.

“In this country these notions were reflected early, and have since been expanded, in legislation designed to secure the comfort and health of seamen aboard ship, hospitalization at home and care abroad. . . . The legislation . . . gives no ground for making inferences adverse to the seaman or restrictive of his rights. . . . Rather it furnishes the strongest basis for regarding them broadly, when an issue concerning their scope arises, and particularly when it relates to the general character of relief the legislation was intended to secure.” Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 728-729 (1943).

Citing Nicholas Schreiber v. K-Sea Transportation Corp. New York, Supreme Court, Appellate Division, April 25, 2006; 5410N Index 104992/04 107571/04:

Petitioner, as a ward of the admiralty, is entitled to heightened protection from the courts. There is a long-standing policy to safeguard the rights of seamen, whose contracts are traditionally viewed with solicitude:

They are emphatically the wards of the admiralty; and though not technically incapable of entering into a valid contract, they are treated in the same manner, as courts of equity are accustomed to treat young heirs, dealing with their expectancies, wards with their guardians, and cestuis que trust with their trustees. . . . If there is any undue inequality in the terms, any disproportion in the bargain, any sacrifice of rights on one side, which are not compensated by extraordinary benefits on the other, the judicial interpretation of the transaction, is that the bargain is unjust and unreasonable, that advantage has been taken of the situation of the weaker party, and that pro tanto the bargain ought to be set aside as inequitable. (Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. at 246, 1942 AMC at 1650, quoting Harden v. Gordon, 2000 AMC 893, 902, 11 Fed Cas 480, 485 [1823])

TEST (3): “[Is] it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?”

ANSWER (3): Yes, by the fact that seamen are wards of the Admiralty.

TEST (4): [Is] the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?

ANSWER (4): The cause of action is strictly for the federal courts. But when the judicial, the executive, and the legislative branch denies all available remedies under the First Amendment right to petitition the government for redress of grievances and the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial under the aggregate effect of appearing to be generalized corruption and obstructions of justice then the only remedy left is the Ninth Amendment right and the Tenth Amendment power reserved to the People to make citizen’s arrests with the Citizen’s Arrest Warrant with accompanying evidence of felony violations of federal law, as in my case, the Seamen’s Suit Law, 28 U.S.C. § 1916. But because the Seamen’s Suit Law does not explicitly provide for such a private right of action such as the Citizen’s Arrest remedy as a remedy of last resort or even the traditional Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial the victim must present a civil case against the United States for a civil jury trial for a judicial determination on the implied private right of action in the Seamen’s Suit Law.

See also, We the People Foundation, et al v. United States, et al, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, No. 04-1211 (August 31, 2005):

The Supreme Court, however, has held that “the First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the government to listen, to respond . . .” See Smith v. Ark. State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979).


We the People Foundation, et al v. United States, et al, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, No. 04-1211 (August 31, 2005). Affirmed, DC Circuit, No. 05-5359 (May 8, 2007) (Certiorari denied, January 7, 2008; Petition for Rehearing denied, February 25, 2008):

We need not resolve this debate, however, because we must follow the binding Supreme Court precedent. See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 10-11 (2005). And under that precedent, Executive and Legislative responses to and consideration of petitions are entrusted to the discretion of those Branches.


If there is no affirmative obligation on the Executive Branch to listen or respond to citizens petitioning the Government for redress of grievance and if there is not right to individual police protection (see Jessica Gonzales (now Lenahan) v. United States, human rights complaint at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights), then we are approaching the threshold of anarchy.

It is my interpretation of the above case precedence that when employees of the U.S. Government, albeit federal judges and their Court Clerk personnel, commit felony extortion in violation of the Rule 4(c)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1916 and 28 U.S.C. § 872 and when the federal courts refuse to rule or deny my Motions for the return of the exempted filing fees and costs (including Pacer Docket Access fees), and when the U.S. Marshals Service, the U.S. Supreme Court Police, and the FBI refuse to act on my First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances and the felony remains at large then I have the Ninth Amendment right and the Tenth Amendment power to make citizen’s arrest of those alleged to have committed the felony extortions, especially so when the extorted payments are documented by the clerks and accounting personnel and evidentiary Court Orders compelling me to pay the Court’s filing fee in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1916 and 28 U.S.C. § 872 serve as a preponderance of evidence of felony extortion.

SIXTH SUPPOSITION: The Seamen’s Suit, 28 U.S.C. § 1916, is a statutory right for U.S. seamen. TRUE!

SEVENTH SUPPOSTION: Statutory rights under the U.S. Code are enforceable in the U.S. District Court. TRUE! (But, as in my cause, for some reason most likely attributed to political bias and corruption of federal judges with a political ideology against the Second Amendment as evidenced by the 8-year judicial history of my Second Amendment case, I have been criminally obstructed and judicially blocked from enforcing my statutory right under the Seamen’s Suit, 28 U.S.C. § 1916. Every month to get nearly $2,000 in filing fees returned have either been ignored and dismissed as moot when my cases got dismissed with and without prejudice or denied outright.) 
EIGHTH SUPPOSITION: Court Orders compelling payment of filing fees is an administrative function of the federal court, NOT a judicial function. TRUE! 
NINTH SUPPOSITION: CASE LAW: A Judge is not immune for tortious acts committed in a purely Administrative, non-judicial capacity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. at 227-229, 108 S.Ct. at 544-545; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 380, 98 S.Ct. at 1106. Mireles v. Waco, 112 S.Ct. 286 at 288 (1991). TRUE! 
TENTH SUPPOSITION: The axiom, “No man is above the law” is derived from the clause in the Magna Carta, “…to none will we deny or delay, right or justice.” TRUE! 
ELEVENTH SUPPOSITION: Theodore Roosevelt, “No man is above the law and no man is below it; nor do we ask any man’s permission when we ask him to obey it. Obedience to the law is demanded as a right; not asked as a favor.” TRUE! 
TWELTH SUPPOSITION: Administrative-capacity torts by a judge do not involve the “performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights,” and therefore do not have the judicial immunity of judicial acts. See: Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 98 L.Ed.2d 555, 108 S.Ct. 538 (1988); Atkinson-Baker & Assoc. v. Kolts, 7 F.3d 1452 at 1454, (9th Cir. 1993). TRUE! 
 THIRTEENTH SUPPOSITION: Rule 64(b) Seizing a Person or Property (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure): Specific Kinds of Remedies. The remedies available under this rule include the following—however designated and regardless of whether state procedure requires an independent action: arrest; attachment; garnishment; replevin; sequestration; and other corresponding or equivalent remedies. TRUE! 
FOURTEENTH SUPPOSITION: On numerous occasions over the years federal judges corruptly denied my Motions for Replevin for the return of extorted filing fees (including PACE Online Docket Access Fees). The FBI, U.S. Marshals Service and the U.S. Department of Justice all refused to take action on my complaint of public corruption of federal judges (i.e., extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 872; obstructions of justice under the RICO Act; comparable to the joint FBI/IRS Criminal Division’s Operation Greylord). I note with particularity three clause from the mission statement of the U.S. Department of Justice: “… to provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime; to seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans.” Because I was denied a judicial remedy and an administrative remedy through through the FBI, the U.S. Marshals Service, and the U.S. Department of Justice I am lawfully left with the remedy of last resort under D.C. Code § 23-582(b)(1)(A) and (c) Arrests Without Warrant by Other Persons. TRUE! (When the Rule of Law is strictly enforced. But appears that the U.S. Marshals Service, the FBI, U.S. Supreme Court Police, and the U.S. Department of Justice enforce only the laws they want to enforce and do not take kindly to being told to enforce laws that protect the rights of the American people.) 
FIFTEETH SUPPOSITION: My self-styled Citizen’s Arrest Warrant is a power reserved to the People under the Tenth Amendment and it is right at common law. TRUE! I include an excerpt from Hudson v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 371, 585 S.E.2d 583 (2003):
At common law, a private citizen may arrest another for a breach of the peace committed in his presence. See Gustke, 516 S.E.2d at 291-92; see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156-57 (1925) (” ‘In cases of misdemeanor, a peace officer like a private person has at common law no power of arresting without a warrant except when a breach of the peace has been committed in his presence . . . .’ ” (quoting 9 Halsbury’s Laws of England 612)); accord W. Page Keeton, ed., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 26 (5th ed. 1984) (“Broadly speaking, either an officer or a private citizen may arrest without a warrant to prevent a felony or a breach of the peace which is being committed . . . in his presence.”) (footnotes omitted). [FN6]
Despite argument on brief that he could only be the subject of a citizen’s arrest for a felony, Hudson conceded at trial that “any normal citizen can pull somebody over for breach of the peace.” 
[FN6] In Byrd v. Commonwealth, 158 Va. 897, 164 S.E. 400 (1932), we described the general parameters of acts constituting a breach of the peace at common law and as recognized in Virginia. 
 “By ‘peace’ as used in the law in this connection, is meant the tranquility enjoyed by the citizens of a municipality or community where good order reigns among its members. It is the natural right of all persons in political society, and any intentional violation of that right is ‘a breach of the peace.’ It is the offense of disturbing the public peace, or a violation of public order or public decorum. Actual personal violence is not an essential element in the offense.” 
Id., 158 Va. at 902-03, 164 S.E. at 402 (quoting Davis v. Burgess, 20 N.W. 540, 542 (Mich. 1884)).
See also 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 1541 n.1 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1898) (“Offenses against the public peace include all acts affecting the public tranquility, such as assaults and batteries, riots, routs and unlawful assemblies, forcible entry and detainer, etc.” (quoting City of Corvallis v. Carlile, 10 Or. 139, 142 (1882)).

The U.S. Marshals Service has based their threats to arrest me on
18 U.S.C. § 111 Assaulting, Resisting, or Impeding Certain Officers or Employees; 18 U.S.C. § 1201. Kidnapping; and 18 U.S.C. § 1203 Hostage Taking if I attempt to make citizen’s arrest of federal judges or court clerks citing. TRUE! However, I contrast the U.S. Marshals Service threats of arrest with case law:
“The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.” Miller v. United States 230 F 486 at 489 
“Where rights as secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which will abrogate them.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 491 (1966).

Therefore, if the U.S. Marshals Service threatened me with arrest for exercising my statutory right under
D.C. Code § 23-582(b)(1)(A) and (c) Arrests Without Warrant by Other Persons or my Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial and all rights to due process under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure then I can presume that the U.S. Marshals Service committed Obstruction of Justice under the RICO Act. And if that is TRUE then I have the right and the the lawful justification to make citizen’s arrest of William Jessup, Anthony Campos, James W. Hays, Dave Loyer, all of the U.S. Marshals Service who have acted to obstruct justice in my enforcement of my statutory right under the Seamen’s Suit Law, 28 U.S.C. § 1916. Hence the legalistic standoff or stalemate until a proper understanding of The Law of Citizen’s Arrest is achieved by all federal law enforcement parties involved. 
SEVENTEETH SUPPOSITION: Marshal William Jessup, Senior Inspector (Judicial Security) believes that I cannot make citizen’s arrest of federal judges for extortion of filing fees because I was not present to witness the judge receiving the filing fees. TRUE! To correct Marshal William Jessup’s misunderstanding of the “presence during the commission of the crime” criteria of the common law right of citizen’s arrest I cite from the law review article, (author unknown) The Law of Citizen’s Arrest, 65 Columbia Law Review, 502-513 (March 1965):
C. Presence During Commission of the Crime 
“. . . the [presence] requirement has been held satisfied in cases of perception by artificial means. For example, where a concealed radio transmitter conveyed sounds indicating the commision of a crime inside a house, the listener was deemed present at the crime for purposes of effecting a valid citizen’s arrest. ( People v. Burgess, 170 Cal. App. 2d 36, 338 P.2d 524 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959). “An exception to the observation requirement has been recognized in cases where a crime has been committed earlier and the supposed offender threatens to renew his criminal conduct. In this situation, the private citizen can make an arrest without having witnessed the commission of a crime. . . . “The traditional requirement of firsthand observation of a crime may well have outlived its usefulness as an appropriate limitation on citizen’s arrest. The purpose of the requirement is presumably to prevent the danger and imposition involved in mistaken arrests based upon uncorroborated or second-hand information. Its principal impact is in cases where the citizen learns of the commission of a crime and assumes the responsibility of preventing the escape of the offender. . . . “. . . In view of the already stringent temporal limitations that insure close proximity to commission of the crime, it would seem preferable to lower the incidence of mistaken arrests not through an arbitrary requirement of firsthand observation but by application of a standard of probable cause — namely, that the apprehension be justified by probable cause for believing a crime had been committed.” Cf. Cal. Pen. Code § 836 (police arrest without a warrant) [Cal. Pen. Code § 836 still current today] Wis. Stat. Ann. § 954.02 (1958) (same) [Wis. Stat. Ann. for arrest without a warrant today is § 23.57] 
D. Notice of Arrest 
“Because every man was privileged to resist unlawful attempts to restrict his freedom, the common law required notice to be given that an apprehension represented a citizen’s arrest. An arrester was obliged to make known his intent and the cause of the arrest. The notice requirement, however, was subject to a number of significant exceptions — as where the arrester reasonably believed that notice woulde either be futile or unnecessary, endanger himself or others, or compromise the success of the arrest.” (See People v. Marendi, 213 N.Y. 600, 608-610, 107 N.E. 1058, 1060-61 (1915); Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 Iowa L. Rev. 201, 250 (1940); Ali, Code of Criminal Procedure § 26, comment at 167 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1928).)“The traditional notice requirement has been adopted by statute in the majority of states. In general the notification must aqccurately point to criminal conduct actually committed, and be communicated prior to the arrest.”  
 E. Detention of the Person Arrested
 “Once proper notice has been given, the citizen must restrain the apprehended person by force or the threat of force for the arrest to be valid. Mere compliance by the arrestee with a request to voluntarily submit to custody is insufficient. Although at common law a restraining touch would of itself effect an arrest even if the arrestee was never brought under physical control, actual detention is generally required by modern statutes.” “The requirement of actual detention provides a necessary condition for determining the liability both of the arrester for commission of false arrest and of the criminal for unlawful escape from custody.”
F. Use of Force . . .

There is no need for me to resort to the use of force because the federal judges, the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court and their court clerks have the U.S. Marshals Service, the Capitol Police, and the U.S . Supreme Court Police to perform the taking into physical custody aspect of citizen’s arrest in accordance with DC Code 23-582(c). I do not have to bring the arrestee to a federal law enforcement agent. The federal law enforcement agent will be present at my request to effect taking into physical custody aspect of the citizen’s arrest. The delivery of my NOTICE OF INTENT TO MAKE CITIZEN’S ARREST with the accompanying CITIZEN’S ARREST WARRANT to the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Marshals Service and the FBI qualifies as the requisite NOTICE OF ARREST as described above in the FIFTEENTH SUPPOSITION.
I have repeatedly instructed Marshal William Jessup and all of the U.S. Marshals Service of the above procedure I intend to use in the performance of citizen’s arrest. But because Marshal William Jessup and all of the U.S. Marshals Service either refuse to accept the lawfulness of the above procedure or the chose to ignore the above procedure in defiance of the U.S. Marshals Service Powers as Sheriff under
28 U.S.C. § 564 Marshal William Jessup and all of the U.S. Marshals Service has committed the crime of Obstruction of Justice under the RICO Act.


If any SUPPOSITION presented above is flawed or incorrect then the recipients of this information previously sent to them by email have a compulsory duty to point out the error or errors to me and state whether or not such error or errors prohibit me from making citizen’s arrest of federal judges and federal court personnel.

Refusal by the U.S. Department of Justice, the FBI, the U.S. Marshals Service, and/or the U.S. Supreme Court Police to notify me of any flawed SUPPOSITIONS will be construed as an admission to the legal validity of the above SUPPOSITIONS. And if the aforementioned federal law enforcement agencies (FLEAS) present any future obstructions of justice with threats of arrest with the intent to prevent me from exercising my right to make citizen’s arrest or if the aforementioned FLEAS refuse to act on my Citizen’s Arrest Warrant when presented to any federal law enforcement officer (FLEO) by refusing to proceed to take the named federal judges and/or court personnel into custody on my behalf will be construed as an obstruction of justice under under federal laws including under the RICO Act whereupon I will have the right and the justification based on probable cause evidence of obstruction of justice to place the offending FLEO under citizen’s arrest. I will then present the citizen’s arrest warrant (Notice of Arrest) to another FLEO until the arrest is made.

And example of a dereliction of duty and treason to the Constitution is exemplified by Justice Thomas. A U.S. Supreme Court justice has never before given testimony to a U.S. Senate hearing admitting to the fact that the nine Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court is purposely avoiding its duty exercise its Article III power to hear a case arising under the Constitution of the United States regarding the Natural Born Citizen clause for the Office of the President under Article II. Common sense dictates that such a dereliction of duty to the Constitution is treason. Where is the FBI on this matter of treason with the U.S. Supreme Court. Or, are federal judges and Justices really above the law?

Just because the common law right of citizen’s arrest has never before been applied to federal judges does not mean that it cannot be applied to federal judges or their administrative personnel.

If I am wrong about anything in the above

If you cannot prove me wrong then STOP
threatening me with arrest and obey the law by
assisting me with the Citizen’s Arrest.


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