Citizen’s Arrest Warrant
For Extortion and Racketeering Activities
FROM: Don Hamrick, pro se
In the Capacity of a Private Attorney General
5860 Wilburn Road
TO: Chief Justice, John G. Roberts
U.S. Supreme Court
One First Street, NE
Washington, DC 20543
TO: The Chief Judge
Of the Below Named Courts
TO: FBI & U.S. Marshals Service
8th CIRCUIT, CASE NO. 07-2400
- U.S. District Court/DC, No. 02-1434 (OBEYED 28 U.S.C. § 1916)
U.S. District Court/DC, No. 02-1435 (OBEYED 28 U.S.C. § 1916)
U.S. District Court/DC, No. 03-2160 (OBEYED 28 U.S.C. § 1916)
U.S. District Court/DC, No. 04-0422 (OBEYED 28 U.S.C. § 1916)
U.S. District Court/DC, No. 04-2040 (OBEYED 28 U.S.C. § 1916)
U.S. District Court/DC, No. 05-1993 (OBEYED 28 U.S.C. § 1916)
U.S. District Court/Charlotte, NC), No. 04-0065 (OBEYED 28 U.S.C. § 1916)
U.S. District Court/Charlotte, NC), No. 04-0344 (OBEYED 28 U.S.C. § 1916)
● DC Circuit, No. 02-5334 (VIOLATED THE LAW)
● DC Circuit, No. 04-5316 (VIOLATED THE LAW)
● DC Circuit, No. 05-5414 (VIOLATED THE LAW)
● DC Circuit, No. 05-5429 (VIOLATED THE LAW)
● U.S. District Court/Little Rock, No. 06-0044. (VIOLATED THE LAW)
● U.S. Supreme Court, Nos. 03-145 (VIOLATED THE LAW)
● U.S. Supreme Court, Nos. 04-1150 (VIOLATED THE LAW)
● U.S. Supreme Court, Nos. 04M56 (VIOLATED THE LAW)
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, at 11 (1991): ”. . . a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S., at 227 -229; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S., at 360 .
Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, at 140 (1970), Chief Justice Berger:
“If [judges] break a law, they can be prosecuted.”
I, Don Hamrick, sui juris, citizen of Arkansas and of the United States under the Ninth, Tenth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, am the unrepresented civil Plaintiff acting in the capacity of a Private Attorney General with a civil RICO Act case against the United States Government (President George W. Bush, et al) and against the United Nations for breach of the United Nations Charter, Article 2, Clause 7, in defense of not only my own rights under the Second Amendment but also for the Second Amendment rights of the citizens of the United States at large, and under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, hereby warrant that probable cause exists to justify the immediate arrest and arraignment of federal judges and their court clerks so named or implicated above on formal charges of participating as principals (18 U.S.C. § 2) in racketeering activities (18 U.S.C. § 1962) as accessory after the facts (18 U.S.C. § 3) and misprision of felony (18 U.S.C. § 4), of an unlawful and an unconstitutional protection scheme over the Second Amendment and for felony extortion (18 U.S.C. § 872) and conspiring to engage in a pattern of racketeering activities and related RICO “predicate acts” in connection with the above Civil RICO action, in violation of the criminal statutes at 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(A), “Extortion” of exempted filing fees from the unrepresented civil Plaintiff Don Hamrick, a fully documented U.S. merchant seamen in violation of the Seamen’s Suit law (28 U.S.C. § 1916).
Pursuant to the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Miranda v. Arizona, the above named or implicated persons have previously been informed, in writing transmitted via first class U.S. Mail and/or by email, that they have the Right to remain silent; that the above named or implicated judges and court clerks have the Right to effective assistance of Counsel; and that anything which they may say, or do, from that point forward, can and will be held against them in a court of Law.
I hereby verify also, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America that I am the victim of felony extortion (18 U.S.C. § 872) under color of law (18 U.S.C. § 241 and 18 U.S.C. § 242) in retaliation for participating in Federal Protected Activities (18 U.S.C. § 245) of the federal judicial system as a U.S. merchant seaman and as an unrepresented civil Plaintiff acting in the capacity of a Private Attorney General in defense of not only my own statutory, civil, and constitutional rights as a U.S. merchant seaman and as a U.S. citizen but also the same statutory, civil, and constitutional rights of all U.S. merchant seamen as a class of citizens and all U.S. citizens at large, and also as an eyewitness to, the criminal violations enumerated above.
Please make all necessary arrangements to execute the arrest of the above named or implicated judges and court clerks, and/or to schedule on-site assistance from the FBI and/or the U.S. Marshals Service to the victim, Don Hamrick, for purposes of executing a proper Citizen’s Arrest, at a time and place convenient to the victim and to your office.
Thank you, in advance, for your immediate cooperation in this matter
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, at 220 (1882):
“No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives.”
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, at 404 (6 Wheaton 264) (1821)
“It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not; but it is equally true that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the Constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is to exercise our best judgment and conscientiously to perform our duty. In doing this on the present occasion, we find this tribunal invested with appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. We find no exception to this grant, and we cannot insert one.”
Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382 (1894):
“[T]he privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States protected by the fourteenth amendment are privileges and immunities arising out of the nature and essential character of the federal government, and granted or secured by the constitution; and due process of law and the equal protection of the laws are secured if the laws operate on all alike, and do not subject the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government; . . .”
Wilson v. State, 33 Arkansas, 557, 560 (1878) (striking a ban on unconcealed carry).
“If cowardly and dishonorable men sometimes shoot unarmed men with army pistols or guns, the evil must be pre vented by the penitentiary and gallows, and not by a general deprivation of a constitutional privilege.”
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) [PLAINTIFF’S NOTE: “I CAN PROVE MY CASE!]
“[A] complaint should not be dismissed unless `it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’“ McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 -46 (1957)).
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 at 48 (1957)
“Following the simple guide of Rule 8 (f) that “all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice,” we have no doubt that petitioners’ complaint adequately set forth a claim and gave the respondents fair notice of its basis. The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits. Cf. Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197. (1938) (Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of arriving at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants. They should not raise barriers which prevent the achievement of that end.)
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, at 16 (1976)
“ . . . it is deeply distressing that the Department of Justice, whose mission is to protect the constitutional liberties of the people of the United States, should even appear to be seeking to subvert them by extreme and dubious legal arguments. It is gratifying that the Court today unanimously rejects the Government’s position.”
Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, at 140 (1970), Chief Justice Berger:
“If [judges] break a law, they can be prosecuted.”
Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, at 140 (1970), Justice Black and Douglas in their dissenting opinion, 398 U.S. 74, at 141-142, agreed with Chief Justice Berger on the point above:
“While judges, like other people, can be tried, convicted, and punished for crimes . . .”
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988):
This Court has never undertaken to articulate a precise and general definition of the class of acts entitled to immunity. The decided cases, however, suggest an intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform. Thus, for example, the informal and ex parte nature of a proceeding has not been thought to imply that an act otherwise within a judge’s lawful jurisdiction was deprived of its judicial character. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363 , n. 12 (1978). Similarly, acting to disbar an attorney as a sanction for contempt of court, by invoking a power “possessed by all courts which have authority to admit attorneys to practice,” does not become less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice or corruption of motive. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall., at 354. [484 U.S. 219, 228] As the Bradley Court noted: “Against the consequences of [judges’] erroneous or irregular action, from whatever motives proceeding, the law has provided for private parties numerous remedies, and to those remedies they must, in such cases, resort.” Ibid.
Administrative decisions, even though they may be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not similarly been regarded as judicial acts. In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), for example, this Court declined to extend immunity to a county judge who had been charged in a criminal indictment with discriminating on the basis of race in selecting trial jurors for the county’s courts. The Court reasoned:
“Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be determined by its character, and not by the character of the agent. Whether he was a county judge or not is of no importance. The duty of selecting jurors might as well have been committed to a private person as to one holding the office of a judge. . . . That the jurors are selected for a court makes no difference. So are court-criers, tipstaves, sheriffs, &c. Is their election or their appointment a judicial act?” Id., at 348.
Although this case involved a criminal charge against a judge, the reach of the Court’s analysis was not in any obvious way confined by that circumstance.
Likewise, judicial immunity has not been extended to judges acting to promulgate a code of conduct for attorneys. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980). In explaining why legislative, rather than judicial, immunity furnished the appropriate standard, we said: “Although it is clear that under Virginia law the issuance of the Bar Code was a proper function of the Virginia Court, propounding the Code was not an act of adjudication but one of rulemaking.” Id., at 731. Similarly, in the same case, we held that judges acting to enforce the Bar Code would be treated like prosecutors, and thus would [484 U.S. 219, 229] be amenable to suit for injunctive and declaratory relief. Id., at 734-737. Cf. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984). Once again, it was the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it, that informed our immunity analysis.
“The Substantial Benefit Doctrine”
A.K.A. “The Private Attorney General Doctrine” & the RICO Act
To improve my education on the RICO Act as an unrepresented civil plaintiff, this past week I purchased by mail order directly from Thomson/West, the Annotated Manual for Complex Litigation, 4th Edition (2006) by David F. Herr. Citing Chapter 35, Civil RICO, p. 792-793. From that book:
Congress enacted the 1920 Racketeer (Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to respond to the “infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce.” Congress targeted organized crime through a broad statutory scheme that included severe criminal penalties, fines, imprisonment, asset forfeiture, and civil remedies in an effort to undermine the economic power of racketeering organizations. The statute further enabled private litigants to act, in effect, as private attorneys general to sue for injury to their businesses or property caused by a RICO violation.
Civil RICO claims have alleged wrongs actionable under state and common law, as well as other federal statutes. Although the statute was targeted at organized crime, courts have broadly construed RICO’s provisions, and its scope has extended well beyond its original aim. Early efforts by lower courts restrict claims that appeared to exceed RICO’s original goals were overruled by Supreme Court decisions that broadened the statute’s reach. RICO claims can now be found in a variety of contexts, including insurance and business disputes, anti[-]abortion and other protests consumer financial services litigation, family law, and whistle-blower actions. Although the nontraditional uses of RICO have continued to expand despite significant criticism by commentators and the courts, Congress has shown little inclination to narrow the state’s focus or reach.
“Private attorney general? What the hell is that?!” (I wondered). A quick search on the Internet and I found one case law from the Supreme Court of Indiana giving a brief overview on the Private Attorney General Doctrine. Bolding, underlined text, and the indexing dots are my emphasis as directly applying to my case:
I. The Private Attorney General Doctrine: An Overview
As a prelude to analyzing Indiana law, we note that there are two basic attorney fee schemes: the English rule (“loser pays”) and the American rule (“every man for himself”). W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why Is the United States the “Odd Man Out” in How It Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 361, 399, 403 (1999). Both schemes are grounded in statute. Id. at 400, 404.
Some view the English rule as more fair, arguing that a legal victory is not complete if one is out of pocket for attorney fees. Id. at 405. Proponents of the American rule respond:
[S]ince litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and  the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents’ counsel. Also, the time, expense, and difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the question of what constitutes reasonable attorney’s fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial administration.
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (citations omitted).
Courts in various American jurisdictions have sought a middle ground by using their inherent equitable powers to carve out exceptions to the American rule. See Saint Joseph’s Coll. v. Morrison, Inc., 158 Ind. App. 272, 279, 302 N.E.2d 865, 870 (1973). The most common exceptions are:
● The “obdurate behavior” exception, in which courts impose costs upon defendants as a punishment for bringing frivolous actions or otherwise acting in bad faith. Andrew W. Hull, Attorney’s Fees for Frivolous, Unreasonable or Groundless Litigation, 20 Ind. L. Rev. 151, 152-53 (1987).
● The “common fund” exception, in which an award benefits members of an ascertainable class, and the court reimburses the prevailing litigant’s attorney fees out of that pool of money to prevent the unjust enrichment of free riders. Id. at n.11.
● The “private attorney general” exception, where courts award fees to litigants who bring actions to protect important social policies or rights. Id.
Judge Jerome Frank coined the phrase “private attorney general” in 1943, to describe a private person acting to “vindicate the public interest.” Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). In 1975, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a federal circuit split by declining to reallocate by judicial decree the burdens of federal litigation under the private attorney general doctrine. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 270 n.46 (1975). The Court expressed concern that without statutory authorization, authority to make fee awards would leave courts free to “pick and choose among plaintiffs and the statutes under which they sue and to award fees in some cases but not in others, depending upon the courts’ assessment of the importance of the public policies involved in particular cases.” Id. at 269. The Court recently reaffirmed its commitment to the American rule, citing Alyeska, in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 121 S.Ct. 1835, 1839 (Rehnquist, C.J., for majority), 1856 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (2001).
. . .
III. Other Jurisdictions Have Mixed Views
States Adopting the Exception.
A number of state high courts have adopted the private attorney general exception. One widely-cited case is Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1977), in which the California Supreme Court recognized the exception because:
In the complex society in which we live it frequently occurs that citizens in great numbers and across a broad spectrum have interests in common. These, while of enormous significance to the society as a whole, do not involve the fortunes of a single individual to the extent necessary to encourage their private vindication in the courts. Although there are within the executive branch of the government offices and institutions (exemplified by the Attorney General) whose function it is to represent the general public in such matters and to ensure proper enforcement, for various reasons the burden of enforcement is not always adequately carried by those offices and institutions, rendering some sort of private action imperative. Because the issues involved in such litigation are often extremely complex and their presentation time-consuming and costly, the availability of representation of such public interests by private attorneys acting pro bono publico is limited.
Id. at 1313.
New Hampshire was among the most recent to adopt the private attorney general doctrine, in Claremont School District v. Governor, 761 A.2d 389 (N.H. 1999)(fees sought following declaratory judgment that the state public education funding system was unconstitutional). The New Hampshire Supreme Court observed that proportional and reasonable taxation is one of the core constitutional foundations of this State” and held that “[t]he public interest in preserving constitutional rights against governmental infringement is paramount. Only private citizens can be expected to ‘guard the guardians.’ Because the benefits of this litigation flow to all members of the public, the plaintiffs should not have to bear the entire cost of this litigation.” Id. at 393-94.
Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, Univ. Illinois Law Review, Vol. 2003, No. 1. pp. 183-209.
In Disarming the Private Attorney General, Professor Karlan describes how the Supreme Court has created a significant regulation remedy gap by critically undercutting one of the primary mechanisms Congress has used for enforcing civil rights: the private attorney general. Professor Karlan identifies a series of techniques the Court has used to strip private individuals of their ability to enforce civil rights laws. On the one hand, the Court has expanded the scope of sovereign immunity under a new “Eleventeenth” Amendment jurisprudence and the scope of compelled arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. On the other hand, the Court has contracted the availability of implied rights of action and attorney’s fees. The overall effect of the Court’s decisions is to severely restrict enforcement of basic antidiscrimination requirements.
William B. Rubenstein, On What a Private Attorney General is – And Why it Matters, Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 57, No. 6, p. 2129, November 2004
First, private attorneys general are persons who mix public and privatefunctions in the adjudicative arena, but they do so in a variety of ways that can best be understood when mapped onto a spectrum. Private attorneys general occupy the middle portion of a lawyering spectrum that runs from private lawyering on one side to public lawyering on the other.
Second, within this middle, three distinct types of public/private mixes are presently identifiable — those I label substitute attorneys general, supplemental attorneys general, and simulated attorneys general.
Third, two sets of legal doctrines — standing and attorneys’ fees — police the margins between private attorneys general and regular attorneys. Standing doctrine polices the boundary between public attorneys and private attorneys general: the former represent the public interest by job description; the latter are permitted in the federal court, to represent the public interest only when they have some private stake of their own in the matter. Attorneys’ fees doctrine polices the boundary between private attorneys and private attorneys general. The former represent only private clients and are paid only by them; the latter perform a function that exceeds pure private representation and are therefore entitled to some different type of fee arrangement.
Fourth, supplemental private attorneys general are synchronically so — performing public and private functions at the same time, not episodically. However, the quantities of public and private presented in the synchronic mix can vary. Some supplemental attorneys general perform significant public functions with only scant private interests at stake (such as environmental citizen-suit plaintiffs) while others perform incidental public functions with significant private interests at stake (such as mass tort class action plaintiffs).
ADVISORY: It is my understanding that if the FBI, the U.S. Marshals Service, the U.S. Attorneys and the U.S. Department of Justice refuse to acknowledge that felony extortion has been committed by the federal courts and/or refuse to assist me with the “Citizen’s Arrest” procedure ( i.e., being present at the time of Citizen’s Arrest in order to take the arrested judge or court clerk into “physical custody” or take any action to hinder or prevent me from making a Citizen’s Arrest by threatening me with arrest that such acts will be construed as Obstruction of Justice, notwithstanding any lawful reason or authority why I cannot make Citizen’s Arrests of judges or court clerks (including the U.S. Supreme Court) for felony extortion under the above circumstances.