My Latest Court filings to beat the U.S. Government’s Motion to Dismiss!
Could my case become “The Second Amendment Trial of the Century?”
Where is the NRA? Why does the NRA refuse to support my case or even refuse to acknowledge the existence of my case?
I FedEx or mailed the 4 volumes and the Addendum of my Civil RICO Act Complaint to Sandra Froman, President of the NRA. Phone calls not only to Sandra Froman but also to Chris Cox and Robert Dowlut always ended up at their voice mail system. They haven’t yet called me back or emailed me in response.
SUPPLEMENT TO PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFF’S BOOKS SUBMITTED AS EVIDENTIARY EXHIBITS FOR TRIAL
U.S. Senate’s Document No. 103-6, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OFAMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION: ANNOTATIONS OF CASES DECIDED BYTHE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES TO JUNE 20, 1992, pub. U.S.Government Printing Office, Washington, DC., 1996.
Military Sealift Command, SMALL ARMS TRAINING & QUALIFICATION GUIDE (adapted from COMSC Instruction 3121.9 “The Standard Operanting Manual” (SOM), Freehold, New Jersey (Government publication, Not dated).
Stephen P. Halbrook, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT, The Independent Institute, Oakland, and, California, 2nd Ed., 1994.
David B. Kopel, Stephen P. Halbrook, Ph.D., Alan Korwin, SUPREME COURT GUN CASES: TWO CENTURIES OF GUN RIGHTS REVEALED, Phoenix, Arizona, Bloomfield Press, 1st Ed., 2004.
David E. Young (Ed.), THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1787-1792. Golden Oak Books, Ontonagon, Michigan, 2nd Ed.,1995.
SECOND SUPPLEMENT TO PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO MOTION TO DISMISS
“Those Damnable Lying Judges and Government Attorneys!”
Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle’s Memorandum Opinion, dated October 9, 2002, in dismissing with my Petition for Writ of Mandamus for the National Open Carry Handgun/Small Arms and Light Weapons endorsement on my Merchant Mariner’s Document stated bold faced lies:
The asserted legal bases for the relief sought by petitioner are the Second,
Ninth, and Thirteenth Amendments of the Constitution, which, he claims,
guarantee the right to carryfirearms openly and without a license in
interstate and intrastate travel. Petitioner argues that the Second
Amendment’s “right of the people to keep and bear arms” renders invalid any
federal or state law restricting what he calls “National Open Carry Handgun”
and requires the President and the Coast Guard to take the actions he has
demanded.Moreover, according to petitioner, federal and state gun control
laws create a form of “legislated slavery” in violation of the Thirteenth
Taking the latter claim first, no court has ever so much as suggested that
the Thirteenth Amendment confers any right to bear arms, and it is entirely
fanciful to suggest that its prohibition of involuntary servitude somehow
unambiguously requires the overturning of a whole variety of gun
controllegislation.1 As for the Second Amendment, while it is true that the
precise meaning of this provision continues to be in dispute in both
judicial andacademic circles, c.f. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d
203 (5th Cir. 2001), the very existence and intensity of that controversy make
mandamus relief a decidedly inappropriate vehicle for fulfilling petitioner’s
demands.2 Mandamus is reserved for circumstances in which the claimant’s
entitlement to relief and the defendant’s obligation to provide such relief are
unambiguous and undebatable. TheSecond Amendment simply offers
no such clarity.3
Moreover, the established law on this subject hardly supports petitioner’s
cause.4 In United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939),
the Supreme Court found that “absent some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,”5 the possession of a
weapon (a short-barreled shotgun) could be proscribed without running afoul of
the Second Amendment. Miller remains the most authoritative modern pronouncement on the amendment’s meaning and its conclusion that the right to bear arms is limited by the needs of an organized militia6 has subsequently been echoed7 by the Supreme Court and followed in this and other circuits. See United
States v. Lewis, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8(1980); Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898, 905-06 (D.C. Cir.1999); accord United States v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that “a federal criminal gun control law does not violate the Second Amendment unless it impairs the state’s ability to maintain a well-regulated militia”). Under this interpretation, petitioner’s claims appear largely without merit.8
In sum, given the breadth of petitioner’s demands and the narrowness of the
constitutional provision that he relies on to justify those demands – more
specifically, the lack of apparent connection between his right to keep and bear
an unlicenced firearm and the needs of any organized militia – petitioner can
establish neither that he has a clear right to relief nor that any of the named
respondents has a clear duty to act. However the Second Amendment may ultimately
come to be interpreted, the current understanding 9 of that text certainly
provides no obvious basis either for the wholesale negation of federal and state
gun laws or for the open carry endorsement that petitioner seeks.10
Adam Winkler in SCRUTINIZING THE SECOND AMENDMENT, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 683 (February,2007), states, “It is clear that the individual-rights reading of the Second Amendment is gaining headway in American legal thought.” He documents that statement with Footnote 7 by stating:
“That the individual right view prevailed definitively is evidenced by the fact that no Second Amendment scholar, no matter how inimical to gun rights, makes the “collective right’s claim any more.”11
11. See Randy E. Barnett, WAS THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS CONDITIONED ONSERVICE IN AN ORGANIZED MILITIA?, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 237, 237 (2004) (book review); see also Glenn Harlan Reynolds, GUN BY GUN: AFTER ALMOST 100 YEARS OF PRETENDING THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS DIDN’T MEAN MUCH, JUDGES AND SCHOLARS ARE CHANGING THEIR MINDS, Legal Aff., May/June 2002, at 19.
Citing Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 1821 Mr. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court, in part, stating:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not:
but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The
judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it
approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by because it
is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be
attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is
not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.12
Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we
can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our
duty. In doing this, on the present occasion, we find this tribunal invested with
appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising under the constitution and laws of
the United States. We find no exception to this grant, and we cannot insert
Therefore, in light of an apparent unanimous academia on the Second Amendment as being an individual right irrespective of the militia my case now as constitutional merit the court now (if it was ever disputed) has subject matter jurisdiction and the support of academia to resolve the dispute in the judicial arena once and for all under the mandate stipulated under Cohens v. Virginia noted above.
THE DOMINOS DOCTRINE
Since I have reasonably disproved Judge Huvelle’s fraudulent assertions that the Second Amendment is not an individual right with the information in my Objection to Motion to Dismiss, my Supplement to Objection to Motion to Dimiss, and my Second Supplement to Objection to Motion to Dismiss (herein noted with appended law review articles) and because Judge Huvelle maintain such assertions as preclusive to mandamus relief then it stands to reason that since I have destroyed Judge Huvelle’s assertions with the proper application of truth that my case does, in fact and law, does have merit for mandamus relief, and because of the 4-years of obstructive activities of the bench and bar this judicial history is hereby construed as racketeering activity under the RICO Act to allege racketeering an unlawful and an unconstitutional protection scheme over the Second Amendment, as if to tip one Domino to topple a whole line of judicial reasoning on the Second Amendment and the RICO Act.
You Left-Wing Liberal Federal Judges Lost the War on the Second Amendment!
Please excuse my rhetoric above.
I have expended excessive amounts of time in my daily activities these past 4 years to search and study law review articles on every subject under the sun to counter every argument by the bench and bar to get this far: finally finding a unanimous academia on the interpretation of the Second Amendment. This discovery now compels the present Court to deny the Government’s Motion to Dismiss because my Second Amendment case is now prime for a trip to the U.S. Supreme Court as a case of first impression with a published opinion from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Northern Division. My case has the potential to be the Second Amendment trial of the century because I will address the Second Amendment not only at the local, State, and Federal levels but also at the international level.
APPENDED LAW REVIEW ARTICLES
Adam Winkler, SCRUTINIZING THE SECOND AMENDMENT, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 683 (February, 2007)
Cheryl Boudreau and Mathew D. McCubbins, THE BATTLE FOR TRUTH: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS REGARDING COMPETITION AND THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM, University of San Diego School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 07-63, September 2006
Monroe H. Freedman, IN PRAISE OF OVERZEALOUS REPRESENTATION – LYING TO JUDGES, DECEIVING THIRD PARTIES, AND OTHER ETHICAL CONDUCT, Hofstra University Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 06-9
Stuart P. Green, LYING, MISLEADING, AND FALSELY DENYING: HOW MORAL CONCEPTS INFORM THE LAW OF PERJURY, FRAUD, AND FALSE STATEMENTS, Hastings Law Review, Vol. 53, Nov. 2001, pp.157-212
APPENDED BOOK REVIEW
William R. Tonso, ‘UNSPEAK’ AND THE GUN PROHIBITIONISTS, February 10, 2007
Mukul Sharma, Difference Between Deception and Lying, Editorial, INDIA TIMES, The Economic Times, Friday, February 9, 2007