NOTICE: Some lunatics have emailed a bunch of insults to me mixed with some valid facts. I thank those loonies for the information that I cannot file a case with the ICJ as an individual. I began looking into the ICJ because I didn’t know crap about it. But I am at least doing my research on the court. This new information tells me that I should present my case to the U.S. State Department for consideration as a case for the ICJ. I appreciate the information because it helps me avoid a serious procedural error.
That is the purpose for my posting about the Court here in the first place which is to get information and advice. For all you mentally instable loonies with zero tolerance for ideas not your own may God have Mercy on the rest of us for enduring the curse of ingrates like you.
Everyone should read Eric A. Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice, University of Chicago – Law School U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 233; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 81 December 2004
The two hypotheses for the ICJ’s long-term decline are in tension with each other. The institutional hypothesis blames the decline on wayward judges who vote their home states’ interests rather than the requirements of international law. The geopolitical hypothesis suggests, or at least leaves open the possibility, that if the judges had been more sensitive to the interests of the major powers, the ICJ may have resisted decline. Thus, the first hypothesis suggests that the judges should have applied international law impartially, while the second suggests that the judges should have applied international law with greater sensitivity to political realities. How could they both be true?
The answer is that a slightly more complex version of the institutional hypothesis may explain why the judges did not take account of geopolitical realities. As I presented the institutional hypothesis, I claimed that states would use the ICJ as long as the ICJ enforced treaties impartially. But international law is complex and states will not necessarily be pleased if treaties are interpreted in an impartial fashion. The problem is that states enter bilateral and multilateral treaties without having a clear view of their obligations and needs decades later, and enforcing these treaties (not to mention customary international law) in a manner that satisfies states is not simply a matter of enforcing them impartially, but of enforcing them in a way that reflects the interests of states as they have developed over time.
Thus, a successful international court must be alert to political realities. This is a proposition that no one has ever denied, not even the ICJ. The question is whether the judges have had the right incentives to respect the interests of the powerful states without at the same time reducing international law to the whims of these states. This brings us to the institutional question. One conjectures that because the judges felt themselves beholden to their home states, they felt pressured to vote their home state’s interests rather than to vote in a way that would maintain the long-term viability of the ICJ. If so, the choices they made would not have reflected geopolitical realities.
Present composition of the Court
Rosalyn Higgins (United Kingdom)
Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh (Jordan)
Raymond Ranjeva (Madagascar)
Shi Jiuyong (China)
Abdul G. Koroma (Sierra Leone)
Gonzalo Parra-Aranguren (Venezuela)
Thomas Buergenthal (United States of America)
Hisashi Owada (Japan)
Bruno Simma (Germany)
Peter Tomka (Slovakia)
Ronny Abraham (France)
Kenneth Keith (New Zealand)
Bernardo Sepúlveda Amor (Mexico)
Mohamed Bennouna (Morocco)
Leonid Skotnikov (Russian Federation )
Mr. Philippe Couvreur (Belgium)